COMMONWEALTH PARTY
OF AMERICA


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Supreme Court Reform








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INDEX:




Intro

Four Strike Justice Removal

Attempts To Figure Length Of Terms, Appointment Intervals, Number Of Justices

New Source Of Approval For Justices

Determining Justice Cycles

Selection Of Chief Justice

Final Fitting Of The "Wheel" Of Justices

Number And Length Of Terms For SCOTUS

Role Of Committees





Summarizing Appointment Processes


•Associate Justices Nominated By President, Approved By Senate:

•Associate Justices Nominated Under Supreme Court Nomination Committee, Approved By State Legislature Elector Bodies:

•Chief Justices Nominated By Supreme Court Nomination Committee, Approved By Circuit Court Judges:





Observations And General Guidelines For Appointment Processes

Rationale For Reform



Sources







Re-Scroll



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Intro


There have been some reform efforts around concerning the Supreme Court with respect to how long members should serve, introducing check on its decisions and critique of circumstances under which new justices are selected. Some ideas along those lines will be presented here as alternative or compliment to such proposals already floating about out there.









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Four Strike Justice Removal


Whatever system we have, there should be a mechanism for the removal of justices who tend to make unconstitutional rulings. The power of judicial review where the Supreme Court can block, nullify or mandate legislative or executive actions in order to achieve constitutional adherence should also apply to the Court itself. Though the Constitution did not state the power of judicial review explicitly, it was intended as expressed by the Framers and was invoked by a case-setting precedent through the Supremacy Clause.


To trigger removals, we would wait until charges of unconstitutional rule against specific justices gets to four. Such charges could only be given successfully when a case is reversed by state legislatures on grounds of unconstitutionality where certain justices had ruled in that case to that effect. Reversal can only occur if 3/5 of the state legislatures approve or 2/3 out of all the state houses (representative and senatorial). The particular article or amendment, section or clause of the Constitution in question would be referred to by the reversal measure and how any were violated by the Court's ruling. We're talking here of the more blatant transgressions against the Constitution, not the gray cases where those of reasonable mind could argue that the issue either way can be constitutionally congruent. Reversal of Supreme Court decisions in some cases by a sufficiency of state legislatures has been proposed elsewhere. Cases having no question of constitutionality are to be immune to the reversals herein proposed.









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Attempts To Figure Length Of Terms, Appointment Intervals, Number Of Justices


What about the length of terms for Supreme Court justices? In the Constitution, judges of the courts 'shall hold their offices* during good behavior' which has been taken as life appointments. There has been in some circles mixed debate as to if that's what was intended but what was definitely intended was for judges to be independent from the political pandering and partisanship of elective office. While a life term can achieve that independence, it may also result in judges too far removed from the civic tide. Also, modern justices are staying in court longer than previous generations with concerns over mental and physical decline accompanying age. Polarization is attributed to this as justices hold out in office until an ideologically agreeable president comes along to nominate their successor.


* 'Offices' as opposed to 'office'. Is the plural application on account of there being several judges or more by each advancing through several offices? Were they to go throughout each to term or one office indefinitely? Is there an inherent open possibility regarding length of terms? Does their compensation mentioned in the same clause change when going from one office to another office? ~ Article III, Section 1 U.S. Constitution


With all this in mind, a term length of 18 years has been proposed which is more in line with an "old school" average while still providing sufficient duration to instill independence yet temper isolation. A court of 9 justices with 18-year max terms means appointing new members every 2 years. An equation working out the standard appointment intervals is thus:




(TERM LENGTH) / (# JUSTICES) = [STANDARD APPOINTMENT INTERVALS]

(18-year term) / (9 justices) = [2-year standard appointment intervals]



However, having presidents appoint justices to the Supreme Court every two years would mean that a two-term president would appoint nearly half the court by having installed 4 of the 9 sitting justices upon leaving office. While not actually packing the court with extra justices, 4 out 9 can mimic that with a similar effect. Instead of "court-packing" we would consider such a situation as "infusing the court".


To lessen a president's appointments we could double the duration of the appointment intervals (one appointment per 4-year term), but at 9 justices this would then take us back to nearer life-term averages according to our standard appointment intervals equation:





(TERM LENGTH) / (# JUSTICES) = [STANDARD APPOINTMENT INTERVALS]

(36-year term) / (9 justices) = [4-year standard appointment intervals]





Maintaining the 4-year standard appointment interval while trying to yield a shorter term for justices would necessitate lowering the number of justices on the court. Applying some algebraic and quantitative range reasoning we get:





(TERM LENGTH) / (# JUSTICES) = [STANDARD APPOINTMENT INTERVALS]

IF

(36-year term) / (9 justices) = [4-year standard appointment intervals]

THEN

(36-year term) = [4-year standard appointment intervals] x (9 justices)

WHERE

(Wanting < 36-year term) =
[4-year standard appointment intervals] X ( Somewhere < 9 justices)





For a more specific term length of 20 years which is close to 18, we invoke the previous line's form of the standard interval equation to get:





(Wanting 20-year term) = [4-year standard appointment intervals] X (5 justices)




You would have to shrink the court down to 5 justices for 20-year terms if keeping standard appointment intervals at 4 years (one appointment per presidential term). However, we're back to the conundrum of "infusing the court" since each two-term president will again supply nearly half the justices (2 out of 5).


If we were to attempt increasing justices to compensate for the infusion, then we start heading back towards too long of terms. Reflecting this outcome means basically looking at the prior equation in the opposite direction while using an expression of range:





[4-year standard appointment intervals] X (Somewhere > 5 justices) =
(Somewhere > 20-year terms)



At just one more justice, we get:

[4-year standard appointment intervals] X (6 justices) = (24-year terms)





If our target was somewhere around 18-year terms, we are now 33% above that at just 6 justices. The other question is whether we want to only have 6 justices on the Court or more generally anything less than 9 justices?









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New Source Of Approval For Justices


What can be done to compensate for such conundrums? Consider that state legislatures have given away their direct input into the federal government via the now total popular election of presidential electors in each state where in the earlier presidential contests at least some electors were chosen directly by state legislatures. Our BEC addresses this by the way. Senators began getting elected through statewide popular vote too in 1913 instead of appointed by state legislatures when the XVII Amendment was ratified. So now, accordingly in the appointment of Supreme Court justices, we should consider the option of letting state legislatures have some influence. Let's try alternating where every other justice would not be nominated by a president and those positions would be filled by individuals whose approval depends on bodies of electors -- each body representing a legislature that has determined that body's number of electors. Each body is filled over time in scheduled equal proportions, each apportion under a sequential incarnation of their associated state legislature occurring since the incarnation that was last scheduled to contribute electors for the last justice intended to be chosen using the same method. These periodic and equally-sized apportions avail each incarnation in such a batch an equal weight of choice within their legislature's body of electors.


When the time has come and the cycle's elector bodies are full, if 27 bodies of electors (near 55% of the states) have approved by simple majorities within themselves of the Supreme Court nominee, the nominee joins the Court. Legislatures make prescription for any ties in their elector bodies. If not enough have approved, repeat this process upon successive nominees until one succeeds.


The next choice of a justice to the Supreme Court is to occur by the deadline linked to the passing of the standard appointment interval from current deadline. Such choice occurs via the original process of a nominee chosen by the president and confirmed by the Senate. After that, the next justice is to come aboard by 27 out of all the legislatures' elector bodies giving approval as just described beforehand.









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Determining Justice Cycles


The vetting and approval of a justice nominee by whichever method to the Supreme Court when approaching end of a uniform term cycle shall be completed by or before the approaching fourth of March (Amendment XII old presidential deadline if that works for everyone) or as close after it should March 4th be Sunday, holiday or due to other relatively brief, impromptu delay such as weather, health event or other hazard. The approved justice nominee shall be sworn-in on such day marking the beginning of a new cycle for that particular justice position. Each successive justice position on the "wheel" will commence likewise. Note that putting in a new justice every two years, we must specify which March 4th the cycles fall on. Picking the second March 4th after the start of a presidential term and the second March 4th occurring after the midpoint of a presidential term would allow over a year's time after presidential and midterm elections so that most new officeholders have time to settle in and prepare for selection of a new justice to the Court.









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Selection Of Chief Justice


Now the Chief Justice of the U.S. has a more executive role on the Supreme Court. They orchestrate the deliberations, oversee the federal courts premises and finances plus the judicial branch as a whole. Having a particular president nominate one for such a position grants more of an influence or legacy to that president in comparison to the others. Though more broad-based, opting to have the state legislatures' pet elector bodies approve the next Chief Justice still provides extra influence or legacy to particular incarnations of the legislatures. So instead of letting some current president or incarnation of legislatures take part in the process of deciding upon who will be the Chief Justice, we have opted for an independent cycle of choice for the Chief Justice where they will be approved by a majority of the Circuit Court judges. While the make-up of this level of the judiciary would be more hodge-podge regarding their variances happening through the comings and goings of their unaligned life terms (for now perhaps), this seems to be a more tolerable unevenness which wins out in comparison to the more extra influence via presidents or legislative elector routes just mentioned. So we'll go with this alternate consideration with its provision of a scheduled intermediary check from within the middle of the judicial branch towards the selection of its top position. Here too, if a nominee fails to be appointed then another one can be vetted. Repeat until success unless the passing of its cycle deadline occurs which is addressed further on in this treatise.









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Final Fitting Of The "Wheel" Of Justices


By appointing a Chief Justice in a way (to be fully revealed further on) that will be somewhat analogous to the House choosing Speaker, Senate the President pro tempore, parliaments a prime minister, papacy a pope albeit our Chief Justice by a layered version with an indirect component -- this has put that position within its own rotation and off of the justices' "wheel". With just the associate justices rotating in and out at standard appointment intervals on the "wheel", the initially associated formula will stand at:





(TERM LENGTH) / (# JUSTICES) = [STANDARD APPOINTMENT INTERVALS]

AT INITIAL VALUES

(18-year term) / (9 justices) = [2-year standard appointment intervals]

WHERE NOW

(# JUSTICES) = 9 minus the Chief Justice going independent circuit

WHICH MEANS

(# JUSTICES) = 8 applicable associate justices left on the "wheel"

BECOMING

(16-year term) / (8 associate justices) = [2-year standard appointment intervals]

WHICH CAN ALSO BE EXPRESSED

(16-year term) = [2-year standard appointment intervals] x (8 associate justices)

MAKING

(TERM LENGTH) = 16-year term for associate justices









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Number And Length Of Terms For SCOTUS


And what should the term length now be for position of Chief Justice? To afford all the rotating associate justices of the Supreme Court the mere opportunity at some point within their full terms to partake in the role of choice towards the next Chief Justice and to have such opportunity more than just once plus to have a greater chance for any one of themselves to serve some time as Chief Justice in the future -- we define one full term as Chief Justice at 8 years.


So what should all the term lengths and limits for all the positions and situations of SCOTUS members be? Well, any justice serving on the Court can accrue any combination or permutation of the following allowable terms or partial terms/periods as long as they do not surpass a total duration of 32 years. (Only a possible few will reach that with its attainment being likely rare.) So....





• Associate Justice full-cycle term: 16 years

• Maximum amount of time allowed to serve as an associate justice full or partial terms: 20 years.



• Chief Justice full-cycle term: 8 years (twice non-consecutive)

• Maximum amount of time allowed to serve as Chief Justice full or partial terms: 22 years.



In General:


Maximum amount of total time to serve on Court for any allowable combination/permutation as associate justice and Chief Justice: 32 years.





Though the overall maximum is set at 32 years, we anticipate the bulk of justices will serve on the Court considerably less. Fewer to rare would clock at the lowest and highest margins.









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Role Of Committees


In the extra-presidential appointment process, we consider two possible methods to be used for obtaining nominees. One is picking a nominee at random from a list. Why would we think of that? Well a random pick would remove the more partisan or undue influences hovering about the selection of a nominee and impede or at least delay any possible pre-planned hijinks whether pro or con. The motives behind such a choice could not be questioned. The lists to choose from could consist of higher level or higher ranking state or federal court judges numbered to provide for drawings in Powerball fashion. The other method would be a committee whose members are appointed by the justices of the Supreme Court when approaching the time of cyclical choosing with each member appointed by one justice where all justices have appointed the same number of members. This committee would assign persons to a recruitment board who would search for nominees and the committee would also assign persons to a vetting board who will carry out interviews and the hearings. The personnel of the boards would be approved by a majority of the committee. After final vetting of the nominee, the prospect is submitted for approval to the bodies of electors in the states. Exactly how would the legislatures select electors for their elector bodies? A state legislature would construct its own committee to choose electors. Each incarnation of a legislature would have such a committee, all of them choosing equal numbers of electors and putting them into the same body that resets after each new justice that's approved by bodies of electors. It's possible electors are sought and vetted by board's on their respective committee.


Not only do these committees or boards provide a linked but indirect method of seeking and vetting nominees or filling the elector bodies, they can be reconvened much later should there need to be a replacement of a justice they originally processed despite the originating incarnations of the Supreme Court or of the legislatures having past. This means that the replacement has a common root with the original justice for sake of continuity and of preserving the influence of previous incarnations of Court and legislatures. On top of that, legislative committees and their elector bodies give batched incarnations of a legislature equal weight in approving a nominee within their particular cycle. With the passage of time though, some on the committees, their boards and the elector bodies may pass or be unavailable. The remaining committee and board members can recruit and vet those of similar perspective to achieve a similar result continuity-wise should they be called to reconvene to choose a replacement for a justice of the Court they previously processed.


When an incarnation of a state legislature assigns persons to their committee who in turn determines the selection of electors to their body of electors, the houses of the legislature may want to do so in bicameral manner -- that is have half the committee members chosen by the state house and the other half by the state senate. What if all legislatures decided to split the committees into two, ending up with two elector bodies -- one for each state house. The approval of a nominee qualifying them for SCOTUS in such a situation could be 27 states where both their elector bodies favor the prospect. It could also be 3/5 of all the elector bodies favoring the nominee whether or not 27 of the states had both their bodies of electors approve.









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Summarizing Appointment Processes


Keeping all that's been so far in mind which has presented the base structures and strategy, we can now provide a complete summary of the different appointment processes:



• Associate Justices Nominated By President, Approved By Senate:


President selects one nominee each term to be vetted and approved by the Senate by the second March 4th past middle of term. If that justice needs to be replaced during any term of that president, replacement is made by same procedure. If the replacement is to take place outside that president's term, a Supreme Court Nomination Committee (SCNC) where each member is chosen by one justice and each justice assigns an equal number of members creates a recruitment board that selects a nominee who is one of that president's other judicial appointments outside of the current Supreme Court. That committee's vetting board carries out a public vetting of the nominee who is to then be submitted for approval to a body of electors assembled by the committee. Should no other such appointments by that president be available, the SCNC recruitment board will entertain other candidate suggestions linked to that administration.


• Associate Justices Nominated Under Supreme Court Nomination Committee, Approved By State Legislature Elector Bodies:


A Supreme Court Nomination Committee (SCNC) where each member is chosen by one justice and each justice assigns an equal number of members creates a recruitment board that selects a nominee. That committee's vetting board carries out a public vetting of the nominee before submission for approval via 27 of the legislatures' elector bodies (near 55% of the states), all happening by the second March 4th past the start of a president's term. If that justice needs replacement, the original Supreme Court Nomination Committee's boards are called out of preservation to reconvene and recruit and vet a new nominee and submit for approval via any 27 of the original legislatures' elector bodies also taken out of preservation. Any missing members of any reconvened committee, boards or elector bodies are to be replaced using same or similar criteria as used to assign the originals -- all in the pursuit of attaining persons of like electoral mindset to those no longer available.


• Chief Justices Nominated By Supreme Court Nomination Committee, Approved By Circuit Court Judges:


A Supreme Court Nomination Committee (SCNC) where each member is chosen by one justice and each justice assigns an equal number of members establishes their recruitment board to select a nominee. That committee's vetting board carries out a public vetting of the nominee before submission to the Circuit Court judges where upon approval by a majority ascends to SCOTUS. Should that Chief Justice need replacement within that term assigned, the same Supreme Court Committee's boards are to reconvene and recruit and carry out a public vetting of a new nominee and submit for approval via majority of the sitting Circuit Court judges at that time. Any missing members of any reconvened committee or boards are to be replaced using same or similar criteria in order to assign persons of similar electoral mindset for those replaced.









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Observations And General Guidelines For Appointment Processes


Having the nominee for Chief Justice selected by a Supreme Court Nomination Committee makes sense with the top of the judiciary contributing to the selection of a nominee who will manage their whole branch. This also provides an independent rotation so that the extra influence regarding a president or regarding legislatures' elector bodies when compared to the rest of their own lots that would occur should they partake in the choosing of this lead position is avoided. Having the cycle period or appointment interval for Chief Justice set for a duration that allows an even spread of the justices' input while they rotate through the Court that avoids any extra or insufficient influence amongst them while also making any Chief Justice's second full term non-consecutive to maintain judicial independence further justifies that method.


Since the term lengths within legislatures or single terms for a president occur less in duration than the length of term for a Chief Justice, straight input from legislatures or presidents towards choosing that position is more prone to influential differences with respect to their own peers in other incarnations or terms. Since the Supreme Court associate justice terms are longest of all and their ranks do not change all at once but more piecemeal, it is easier for Supreme Court incarnations to acquire equal opportunity of choice or yield evenly-metered amounts of influence towards choice of Chief Justice as well as choice towards fellow associate justice positions as they rotate on the "wheel".


In the above summaries, if the method of drawing a random nominee from a numbered list of higher court positions (or whatever applicable pool) is preferred, the random drawing can supplant the recruiting board under the Supreme Court Nomination Committees (SCNC). Maybe there would be desire to keep a balance of state and federal judges going to the Supreme Court so alternating between state and federal lists would be an option. Also the level of judges could alternate as well by going between associate judges and chief justices within those lists. Whatever approach using random drawings from a list, only judges who have been appointed or advanced to their positions within a judiciary should be considered -- not those who are popularly elected to their positions. Applying these balances and conditions to nominees selected by a SCNC recruitment board should be considered as well.


Should these methods for selecting justices to the Supreme Court not have chosen a justice by their respective deadlines, then from a list of eligible higher state and/or federal courts a random judge will be chosen. The House of Representatives will assemble a vetting board or use an applicable committee already constructed to carry out a vetting process. Afterwards, the House will gather to determine the approval of the random nominee using a quorum for that purpose in Amendment XII fashion.


In the vetting of nominees note that those selected who have prior experience as justice of the Supreme Court will likely need less vetting as they have already been examined in preparation for their previous time on the Court and what vetting should be performed should focus on what they have done since being justice or provide explanation on points of their prior Court actions.


For the associate justices nominated by a president, the applicable March 4th deadline is over a year past that president's term midpoint which allows for a longer amount of time in office to observe a first-term president, thus making for a better gauge of their intentions about their choice of nominee.









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Rationale For Reform


Before concluding we should touch on the rationale for the changes we've proposed. For right or wrong reasons, people increasingly distrust our institutions. This includes our education system, the media, financial and banking, corporations and unions, politicians and political parties -- the overly litigious courts. It hasn't mustered much confidence when nominees to the highest court have in some cases been subjected to such a salacious vetting process in the recent era. Civic understanding of the populace has lowered where with regard to the Court there is talk of the need for appointees to reflect the various demographics or favor partisan politics over judicial principle as if the Supreme Court is to be an alternate representational legislative body. The Court and all courts should instead look to recruiting legal professionals who know the law and sound precedents, trained to apply them in fair objective fashion in pursuance to the Supreme Law of the Land -- the Constitution.


The more partisan spectacle of appointing justices to the Court has belied this, incited by our current polarization via duopoly and in part by the desperate nature arising from longer-in-the-tooth, life-term justices and their more irregular appointments. Justices should not rule by looking to contradictory foreign philosophies or the isms subverting universities today away from historical truths. Thus in this atmosphere, we consider more checks on the Court with regard to maintaining constitutional rulings including using the more widespread elector bodies ascribed to state legislatures in approving some justices. This endeavor entails some tempering to the monopoly of the appointment of justices about the power circles within the Den of Corruption -- D.C. Hopefully such changes would bring some confidence back into the appointment process to the Court after all the drama of the more raucous Senate Judiciary Hearings.


While there can still be drama and uniparty manipulations in the state capitals as well, at least it may not be so much in every capital or able to congeal as well as it can in D.C. With all the endless conspiracy theories, scandals, investigations, dubious or constrained impeachments mixed with media mobs riling the populace in their premature and biased coverage of high profile criminal justice incidents and the blatant weaponization / neutering of judicial and law enforcement agencies (DOJ, IRS, FBI, Border Patrol) for political gain -- it is a good time to meter out judicial appointments to the Supreme Court, lessen the exclusivity of D.C. in that realm, limit terms while allowing sufficient duration for independence on the Court and for putting some check on the Court's finality and personnel regarding judicial review. These efforts are done in the vain that if the Framer's were around today they would understand why these changes have been proposed in light of today's hindsight.









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Appointments and Numbers -- SCOTUS


'The Supreme Court is the Nation's highest court. Eight Associate Justices and one Chief Justice comprise the membership of the Court. Like all Federal judges, Supreme Court Justices serve lifetime appointments on the Court, in accordance with Article III of the United States Constitution.'


'When a vacancy occurs on the Supreme Court, the President of the United States is given the authority, under Article II of the United States Constitution, to nominate a person to fill the vacancy. The nomination is referred to the United States Senate, where the Senate Judiciary Committee holds a hearing where the nominee provides testimony and responds to questions from members of the panel. Traditionally, the Committee refers the nomination to the full Senate for consideration.'

https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/supreme-court




'The Judiciary Committee will decide whether to report the nomination favorably to the full Senate, report it unfavorably, or report it without a recommendation. The full Senate will vote on whether to confirm or reject the nominee. (No nominee has been rejected in a Senate vote since 1987, when the Senate rejected Robert Bork after he had been nominated by President Ronald Reagan.) If a nominee is confirmed, they will receive their commission and take two oaths before starting to perform their duties. These are the oath required of federal officials under Article VI of the Constitution, as well as an oath required by the Judiciary Act of 1789.'


'Justices generally may hold tenure for life, as long as they maintain “good behavior.” Their salaries may not be reduced while they are in office. In theory, a Justice may be removed if they are impeached by the House of Representatives and convicted by the Senate. Justice Samuel Chase was impeached by the House in 1804, but he was acquitted by the Senate a year later. Chase is the only Justice to have been impeached, and no Justice has ever been removed.'

https://supreme.justia.com/justices/




'The number of Justices on the Supreme Court changed six times before settling at the present total of nine in 1869. Since the formation of the Court in 1790, there have been only 17 Chief Justices* and 104 Associate Justices, with Justices serving for an average of 16 years. Despite this important institutional continuity, the Court has had periodic infusions of new Justices and new ideas throughout its existence; on average a new Justice joins the Court almost every two years.'

https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/institution.aspx




'The Constitution places the power to determine the number of Justices in the hands of Congress. The first Judiciary Act, passed in 1789, set the number of Justices at six, one Chief Justice and five Associates. Over the years Congress has passed various acts to change this number, fluctuating from a low of five to a high of ten. The Judiciary Act of 1869 fixed the number of Justices at nine and no subsequent change to the number of Justices has occurred.'

https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/faq_general.aspx




'There are currently 9 Supreme Court Justices but theoretically a U.S. president could appoint a lot more depending upon a variety of circumstances. First would be how long the president served and second would be how many justices died or retired during a particular president’s time in office. Washington holds the current record as he nominated 14, of which 12 were confirmed; but Washington also started with a clean slate. Four presidents, Jimmy Carter, Andrew Johnson, Zachary Taylor, and William Henry Harrison, didn’t even nominate a single person for the Supreme Court.' ~ Richard Merrill | Nov 8

https://www.quora.com/How-many-supreme-court-judges-can-a-U-S-president-appoint




'The far left and right-hand columns tell an important story. Presidents are making fewer appointments because justices are serving longer. In the first quarter, presidents appointed 21 justices, who served a median of 15 years. In the most recent quarter, presidents appointed only 11 justices, but for justices appointed since 1961, the median years of service is well over 20—almost 30 for Ginsburg and Breyer. Thomas (not shown) has already served over 30 years, and similar ranges can be projected for the other sitting justices, especially because the median age at appointment has dropped from the mid-50s to 51 for the last period shown. Longer tenure, less turnover, fewer appointments. '


'Generally, though, more frequent turnover of justices (appointed by presidents and confirmed by senate majorities both of which represent popular majorities) helps keep the Court from straying too far from the mainstream.' ~ Russell Wheeler | February 17, 2022

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/changes-in-supreme-court-
appointments-fewer-justices-longer-terms-more-contentious-confirmations/





'Since the Supreme Court was established in 1789, presidents have submitted 165 nominations for the Court, including those for chief justice. Of this total, 128 were confirmed (7 declined to serve). This chart lists nominations officially submitted to the Senate.'

https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/
SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm





Table includes justices' years of service on Supreme Court.

https://supremecourthistory.org/appointments-of-the-justices/




'The average number of years that Justices have served is 16.'

https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/faq_justices.aspx













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Pool of Justices


'Backgrounds of the Justices'


https://supremecourthistory.org/backgrounds-of-the-justices/




'Just over half of all current and former justices went to an Ivy League institution. In fact, each of the current justices attended one of two particular Ivy League schools: Harvard or Yale.'


'Among all former justices, new members were an average of 53 years old when sworn in, served for an average 16.9 years and ended their tenure at an average age of 69.' ~ KRISTEN BIALIK | MARCH 20, 2017


https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2017/03/20/what-backgrounds-do-u-s-supreme-court-justices-have/




'Although the rules for appointing and confirming a U.S. Supreme Court justice are set out in the U.S. Constitution, the process for choosing nominees is not codified in law. Past presidents have received lists of recommendations from the White House counsel, the attorney general and lawyers in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. Justices have often been friends or acquaintances who shared ideological views with the president.'


'The nominating process is also influenced by individuals and organizations outside of the administration. The American Bar Association (ABA), through its 15-member Committee on Federal Judiciary, rates nominees as "well qualified," "qualified" or "not qualified." Others also lobby the president to choose nominees sympathetic to their views or to oppose those with whom they differ.'


'But a nominee's views do not always conform to their future opinions. Some justices have ruled in ways that surprised the presidents who nominated them. Notable examples are Justice Tom C. Clark (nominated by President Harry S. Truman), Chief Justice Earl Warren (nominated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower) and Justice David Souter (nominated by President George H. W. Bush).'


'After the president nominates an individual, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducts a rigorous investigation into the nominee’s background, gleaning a sense of his or her judicial philosophy and temperament, which helps inform whether the senator will support the nominee. During this part of the process, the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary reviews the nominee. The nominee also visits with senators in their offices in order to help win support for nomination. The most public aspect of the process is when the nominee testifies before the Judiciary Committee and takes questions.'

https://ballotpedia.org/Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States













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Federal Judiciary: Form and Function


'The federal court system has three main levels: district courts (the trial court), circuit courts which are the first level of appeal, and the Supreme Court of the United States, the final level of appeal in the federal system. There are 94 district courts, 13 circuit courts, and one Supreme Court throughout the country.'


'Judges may hold their position for the rest of their lives, but many resign or retire earlier.'


'One exception to the lifetime appointment is for magistrate judges, which are selected by district judges and serve a specified term.'


'The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest court in the American judicial system, and has the power to decide appeals on all cases brought in federal court or those brought in state court but dealing with federal law.'


'The Court typically hears cases when there are conflicting decisions across the country on a particular issue or when there is an egregious error in a case.'


'The Constitution sets no requirements for Supreme Court justices, though all current members of the court are lawyers and most have served as circuit court judges. Justices are also often former law professors.'

https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts




'The Supreme Court is "distinctly American in concept and function," as Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes observed. Few other courts in the world have the same authority of constitutional interpretation and none have exercised it for as long or with as much influence. In 1835, the French political observer Alexis de Tocqueville noted the unique position of the Supreme Court in the history of nations and of jurisprudence. "The representative system of government has been adopted in several states of Europe," he remarked, "but I am unaware that any nation of the globe has hitherto organized a judicial power in the same manner as the Americans. . . . A more imposing judicial power was never constituted by any people."


'The complex role of the Supreme Court in this system derives from its authority to invalidate legislation or executive actions which, in the Court’s considered judgment, conflict with the Constitution. This power of "judicial review" has given the Court a crucial responsibility in assuring individual rights, as well as in maintaining a "living Constitution" whose broad provisions are continually applied to complicated new situations.'


'While the function of judicial review is not explicitly provided in the Constitution, it had been anticipated before the adoption of that document. Prior to 1789, state courts had already overturned legislative acts which conflicted with state constitutions. Moreover, many of the Founding Fathers expected the Supreme Court to assume this role in regard to the Constitution; Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, for example, had underlined the importance of judicial review in the Federalist Papers, which urged adoption of the Constitution.'


'When the Supreme Court rules on a constitutional issue, that judgment is virtually final; its decisions can be altered only by the rarely used procedure of constitutional amendment or by a new ruling of the Court. However, when the Court interprets a statute, new legislative action can be taken.'

https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx




'Constitution tells us little about the make-up or organization of the court; it gives no qualifications for holding seats on the court, and doesn’t establish how many justices will be on the court.'


'If four of the nine Justices feel the case has value, they will issue a writ of certiorari. This is a legal order from the high court for the lower court to send the records of the case to them for review.'


'The Justices of the Supreme Court are most likely to take cases that will affect the entire country, not just the individuals involved. They want to clarify legal issues that are important to as many people as possible, so they take cases that will have a large constitutional impact, or that answer important legal questions that affect the whole nation.'


'By taking a case that involves an issue that has led to differing opinions in the lower courts, the Supreme Court creates a precedent that every court in the country has to follow. This guarantees that the laws are applied equally to all people, no matter where they live.'

https://judiciallearningcenter.org/the-us-supreme-court/




'The federal judiciary operates separately from the executive and legislative branches, but often works with them as the Constitution requires. Federal laws are passed by Congress and signed by the President. The judicial branch decides the constitutionality of federal laws and resolves other disputes about federal laws. However, judges depend on our government’s executive branch to enforce court decisions.'


'Courts decide what really happened and what should be done about it. They decide whether a person committed a crime and what the punishment should be. They also provide a peaceful way to decide private disputes that people can’t resolve themselves. Depending on the dispute or crime, some cases end up in the federal courts and some end up in state courts.'


'Congress created several Article I, or legislative courts, that do not have full judicial power. Judicial power is the authority to be the final decider in all questions of Constitutional law, all questions of federal law and to hear claims at the core of habeas corpus issues.'

https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure




'Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Before Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, which created new courts, added judges, and gave the president more control over appointment of judges. The Act was essentially an attempt by Adams and his party to frustrate his successor, as he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new justices of the peace. The appointees were approved by the Senate, but they would not be valid until their commissions were delivered by the Secretary of State.'


'William Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, but his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the new Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents. Marbury, joined by three other similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the delivery of the commissions.'


'Marshall expanded that a writ of mandamus was the proper way to seek a remedy, but concluded the Court could not issue it. Marshall reasoned that the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution. Congress did not have power to modify the Constitution through regular legislation because Supremacy Clause places the Constitution before the laws.'


'In so holding, Marshall established the principle of judicial review, i.e., the power to declare a law unconstitutional.'

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/5us137




'Judicial review, power of the courts of a country to examine the actions of the legislative, executive, and administrative arms of the government and to determine whether such actions are consistent with the constitution. Actions judged inconsistent are declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. The institution of judicial review in this sense depends upon the existence of a written constitution.' ~ C. Neal Tate | 19 Dec. 2023

https://www.britannica.com/topic/judicial-review




'In political rhetoric activism is used as a pejorative. To describe judges as activist in this sense is to argue that they decide cases on the basis of their own policy preferences rather than a faithful interpretation of the law, thus abandoning the impartial judicial role and “legislating from the bench.”


'Since neither conservatives nor liberals claim that judicial decisions should be based on politics rather than law, the debate over judicial activism does not take the form of arguments for and against.' ~ Kermit Roosevelt | Last Updated: Dec 29, 2023

https://www.britannica.com/topic/judicial-activism













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*anchor for 'Reasons for Reforming Supreme Court'



Reasons for Reforming Supreme Court


'But this connection between the Court and the public has grown tenuous, undercutting the Court’s democratic legitimacy. For instance, it is increasingly common for presidents to have no opportunity to fill a single Supreme Court seat during a four-year term. Up until President Jimmy Carter, this was a rare occurrence: from President George Washington through President Gerald Ford, only 5 out of 47 presidential terms were without any Supreme Court appointments. But in the 12 presidential terms since then, there have already been 4 with no appointments.'


They are talking about terms without nominations -- not presidents. Courts are to interpret law and handle disputes within legal parameters without regard to the trends of popular democracy. That is how the check and balance of this branch was intended.


'There are also wide disparities in the number of seats individual presidents have had the opportunity to fill, contributing to stark imbalances on the Court. Beginning with President George H. W. Bush, who appointed the longest-serving justice currently on the bench (Justice Thomas), Republicans have won four out of nine presidential terms and won the popular vote only twice. But Republicans have appointed six of the current nine justices. This supermajority has already had a transformative effect, handing down rulings on issues including civil rights, gun rights, and abortion that disproportionately harm vulnerable communities and are unmoored from the values of the American public. Not surprisingly, public confidence in the Court has plummeted.'


As the interests of the progressives see it. Nonetheless, the proportionality argument has some merit.


'Under the active/senior justice model, Supreme Court justices retain life tenure, but their tenure is divided into two distinct periods: a phase of active service lasting 18 years and a senior phase lasting for the remainder of a justice’s life This framework would apply to both associate justices and the chief justice. After 18 years, a new chief justice would be appointed and the prior chief would assume senior status.'


'With respect to the Supreme Court, federal law authorizes the chief justice to designate justices who have retired from active service to sit on lower federal courts. Justices regularly do so. For example, since retiring from active service in 2009, Justice David Souter has sat by designation in the First Circuit and heard more than 500 cases, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor regularly heard cases on federal appeals courts for more than a decade after her retirement in 2006. Justices who have retired from active service also regularly maintain chambers and employ law clerks'


'it has been more than half a century since a justice served for less than 18 years.'


'Term limits combined with regularized appointments would enhance the democratic link between the Court and the public. Under this system, every presidential term would carry equal opportunity to shape the Court’s direction. No individual president would have the chance to install a majority on the Court, nor would a political party be able to lock in a particular ideology for generations over a short period. In addition, adopting these reforms would remove current incentives to appoint increasingly younger justices so as to secure power for a longer period. It would also eliminate opportunities for justices to strategically retire, returning power over the trajectory of the Court to the public via their representatives, as the Constitution envisions.'


While the concerns over the length of terms and irregularity of appointments is understandable, again not the Supreme Court nor any court should be regarded as a representative body like a legislative body. Courts are to be smaller groups of professional judicial appointments tasked to make legal and ethical decisions towards the applicability of our laws under the Constitution in fair and non-partisan manner. Their penchant for legal knowledge and experience in making case decisions is the paramount quality -- not the overtly cultural, sexual, racial, religious or political identity of the justice as stressed by progressives in order to make feel-good inclusiveness signals for particular minorities. Similar can be said for some strict tradcons.


'The value of judicial independence is embedded in this constitutional design. By providing that judges hold their offices during good behavior, the Constitution prevents Congress from ousting judges from office other than through the high bar of impeachment and removal. And by prohibiting the diminution of judicial salaries, the Constitution guards against retaliation by the political branches for unpopular decisions.'


'Likewise, Congress has the power to establish 18-year terms for justices so long as the justices continue to “hold their Offices during good Behaviour” after leaving active service, as required by Article III. The active/senior justice model comports with the Good Behavior Clause by providing that after 18 years, justices retain their judicial offices as senior justices with modified responsibilities.' ~ Alicia Bannon, Michael Milov-Cordoba | June 20, 2023

https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/supreme-court-term-limits?
ms=gad_supreme%20court%20justice%20term%20length_
663741999762_8626214133_147498998541





'Drawing on both originalism and formalism, Dow and Mehta begin by observing that the constitutional text does not expressly provide for lifetime tenure; rather, it states that judges shall hold their office during good behavior. The good behavior criterion, however, was not intended to create judicial sinecures for 20 or 30 years, but instead aimed at safeguarding judicial independence from the political branches. By measuring both the length of judicial tenure among Supreme Court justices, as well as voting behavior on the Supreme Court, Dow and Mehta conclude that, in fact, life tenure has proven inconsistent with judicial independence. They maintain that the Framers’ objective of insuring judicial independence is best achieved by term limits for Supreme Court justices.'


'Similarly, if the Framers believed that turnover among justices would be sufficiently regular as to neutralize ideological polarization, but turnover no longer happens at a rate adequate to accomplish that goal, then there is another originalist argument for decoupling the good behavior clause from the life tenure guarantee. Likewise, if the purpose of the good behavior clause was to ensure judicial independence, and if in fact life tenure undermines such independence, the conventional assumption that good behavior grants life tenure may be unsound.'


'Even more striking is the second chart, which demonstrates the sharp rise in cases decided by a one-vote margin (or in which the lower court judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court). Because the number of justices has been fixed at nine since 1869, most cases in this category are 5-4 decisions. Until 1930, fewer than 2 percent of cases were so closely divided. But this phenomenon has become much more common in the last 90 years, and since 1990, it has occurred in nearly one-fifth (18.7 percent) of cases.'


'Good behavior might not exist when justices vote largely along ideological lines, especially when those ideological lines betray a lack of independence from the political branches. Alternatively, the good behavior standard might have been embraced by the Framers on the premise Supreme Court justices would serve substantially shorter terms than they presently do.'


'Framers might have written that judges would hold their office during good behavior, until death. That formulation would have been redundant, and therefore excluded by ordinary canons of interpretation, if life tenure is inherent in the good behavior clause. But it is also possible the Framers intended to limit judicial terms to good behavior, while also anticipating that judges would not serve for the duration of their natural lives.'


'Even Hamilton’s well-known The Federalist No. 78 is less a fullthroated endorsement of life tenure than an embrace of judicial independence, and furthermore, the importance of a judicial check on the political branches. As he said concerning the good behavior standard'


'In terms of insulating the judicial branch from ordinary politics, term limits could not fare any worse than life tenure, and there are therefore compelling policy reasons, grounded in originalism, for Congress to enact such limits.' ~ DAVID R. DOW & SANAT MEHTA | 2021

https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1172&context=djclpp




'Fix the Court has said that unaccountable officials serving for decades on end and ruling on our country’s most important issues is not what our Founders intended when copying and pasting a section of a 1701 English judicial tenure law into Article III of the Constitution.'


'The vast majority of the country (77% according one FTC poll) agrees that life tenure is problematic.'


'So how can we hold the justices accountable to the Constitution and to their ethical obligations while ensuring that they remain independent from politics? Our answer is this: a single, standard 18-year term.'


'Here’s how it’d work: a new justice would be added every other year and after 18 years rotate to a lower court. In other words, future justices would keep Article III life tenure, but they wouldn’t serve on SCOTUS for more than 18 years.'


'Life tenure has turned Supreme Court nominations into a political circus. It’s no longer a priority to find the best candidate for the job – a candidate who will serve with integrity and who has experience outside of an appellate courtroom. Instead, the party in charge scrambles to find the youngest, often most ideological nominee (who, at the same time, knows to say the right things at a confirmation hearing) in order to control the seat for decades to come.'

https://fixthecourt.com/termlimits/













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*anchor for 'Court-Packing'



Court-Packing


: the act or practice of packing (see PACK entry 3 sense 1) a court and especially the United States Supreme Court by increasing the number of judges or justices in an attempt to change the ideological makeup of the court'

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/court-packing




'Unlike Congress or the presidency, the Supreme Court is not supposed to be a "political" institution. It must remain neutral in order to settle legal issues, interpret laws, and decide the meaning of the Constitution. Supreme Court justices should not allow their personal or political views to color their decisions. Neither should they permit themselves to be influenced by presidents, other politicians, or popular public opinion. To help assure the justices' independence, the Constitution provides that they serve life terms unless they resign, retire, or are removed for misbehavior.'


'Although appointed by a Republican (Hoover), Chief Justice Hughes tended to vote with the liberals in cases concerning New Deal legislation.'


'Much to the surprise of President Roosevelt, his court-reform plan came under serious attack. The press soon began to refer to it as FDR's "court-packing" scheme. The president was compared with Hitler in seeking dictatorial powers. Even some liberal New Deal Democrats in Congress voiced their reservations.'


'As it turned out in the years that followed, the Supreme Court upheld virtually all of FDR's New Deal reforms. Over the span of his remaining three terms in office, Roosevelt got to name a total of eight new justices to the Supreme Court. In the end, he did get to "pack" the court with men of his choosing.' | Fall 1994 (10:4) :: Updated July 2000

https://teachdemocracy.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-10-4-a-fdr-tries-to-pack-the-supreme-court.html




'On February 5, 1937, President Franklin Roosevelt announces a plan to expand the Supreme Court to as many as 15 judges, allegedly to make it more efficient. Critics immediately charged that Roosevelt was trying to “pack” the court and thus neutralize Supreme Court justices hostile to his New Deal.'


'During the previous two years, the high court had struck down several key pieces of New Deal legislation on the grounds that the laws delegated an unconstitutional amount of authority to the executive branch and the federal government.' | Original Published Date February 9, 2010 :: Last Updated February 2, 2024

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/roosevelt-announces-court-packing-plan




'Progressives amplified their calls to expand the Supreme Court in hopes of appointing more liberal justices to balance the scales of power after the conservative-majority court delivered several victories to Republicans last week, prompting outrage among Democrats.'


'Reps. Don Beyer (D-Va.) and Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) also reintroduced legislation last week to impose 18-year term limits for Supreme Court justices, legislation Beyer said would “help restore balance to a heavily politicized court.”


'Biden has long been opposed to the practice known as “court-packing,” when one party stacks the judiciary with their own nominees: He said Thursday the Supreme Court was “not a normal court,” but in a subsequent interview on MSNBC said that expanding the number of justices could “politicize it maybe forever in a way that’s not healthy.”


“Maybe it’s just the optimist in me—I think that some of the court are beginning to realize their legitimacy is being questioned in ways that it hadn’t been questioned in the past,” Biden told MSNBC’s Nicolle Wallace on Thursday.'


'Republicans, and some centrist Democrats, are broadly opposed to adding more justices to the Supreme Court. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) introduced a constitutional amendment in 2021 that would ensure only nine justices could serve on the court at a time.' ~ Sara Dorn | Jul 5, 2023 04:57pm EDT

https://www.forbes.com/sites/saradorn/2023/07/05/democrats-push-for-court-packing-after-controversial-supreme-court-rulings-why-the-proposal-is-likely-doomed/?sh=48ad0a4062ad




'The confirmation of Supreme Court Associate Justice Amy Coney Barrett eight days before the election by a partisan 52-48 vote has renewed questions about whether Democrats will try to increase the number of justices on the country’s highest court. The move is particularly polarizing because Republicans refused to consider President Obama's nominee Merrick Garland to fill a vacancy that occurred nine months before the 2016 election, but rushed to fill the seat following the death of liberal stalwart Ruth Bader Ginsburg.'


'People often use "court packing" to describe changes to the size of the Supreme Court, but it's better understood as any effort to manipulate the Court's membership for partisan ends. A political party that's engaged in court packing will usually violate norms that govern who is appointed (e.g., only appoint jurists who respect precedent) and how the appointment process works (e.g., no appointments during a presidential election).'


'Restoring a sense of balance to the Court will require Republicans and Democrats to come together and agree on new rules for how justices are chosen and the kind of jurists who serve on the Court.'


'In 2013, the Senate – then controlled by Democrats – eliminated the filibuster for circuit court nominees. That allowed circuit court judges to be confirmed with a bare majority of Senators. When Trump nominated Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court in 2017, the Republican-controlled Senate eliminated the filibuster for Supreme Court nominees. By the time Justice Ginsburg passed away, conditions were perfect for a breakneck confirmation.' ~ Elizabeth A. Moore | October 27, 2020

https://www.rutgers.edu/news/what-court-packing













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*anchor for 'Why State High Court Justices to SCOTUS'



Why State High Court Justices to SCOTUS


'Potential audiences for this study are broad and diverse. Paramount among these are members of Congress and federal executive branch agencies, as both the legislative and executive branches routinely revise existing policies or make new ones without any sense of how state courts implement and enforce those policies. Consequently, those responsible for disbursement of federal funding are often unaware of the extent to which the underlying federal programs—and the policies for which those funds have been appropriated—depend for their success on underfunded and under-resourced state judiciaries. With considerable accumulated experience implementing those policies, state courts are important not merely for the judgments they render but also for the guidance they can provide to policymakers. For these reasons, this study may be useful to federal officials, state officials, federal and state judiciaries, funding agencies, and the public.'


'And the mere grant of jurisdiction to federal court does not operate to automatically oust state court from concurrent jurisdiction over federal causes of action. Quite the contrary is needed; a specific ousting of state court jurisdiction is required to deprive them of the power to adjudicate federal claims.'


'Why is the principle of concurrency so important in understanding the role of state courts in enforcing federal law and policy? Because this principle, as distinguished from the federal courts’ supplementary jurisdiction (generally a function of judicial economy), means that state courts can entertain a wide range of federal claims, including constitutional claims. Thus, Congress’s statutory delegation of certain federal responsibilities to state courts is only one part of a very large network of understandings. These statutory delegations are accompanied by an extensive volume of caselaw grounded in certain understandings of federalism and the constitutional design of American government.'


'State courts routinely hear cases arising under federal law and have done so for more than two hundred years. “[T]he constitution not only contemplated, but meant to provide for cases within the scope of the judicial power of the United States, which might yet depend before state tribunals. It was foreseen that in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction, state courts would incidentally take cognizance of cases arising under the constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.”


'In Arizona v. Evans, the Supreme Court explained that “[s]tate courts, in appropriate cases, are not merely free to—they are bound to—interpret the United States Constitution.” The same may be true for other sources of federal law. For example, when a federal statute provides a defense to a state-law cause of action, a state court may adjudicate the federal defense.' | January 2022

https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/74207/The-Role-of-State-Courts-in-our-Federal-System.pdf




'State courts are the final arbiters of cases interpreting state laws and constitutions. However, there are times when cases heard in state courts can be reviewed by federal courts. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution states that federal laws, treaties and the Constitution are the supreme laws of the land and take precedent over state laws and constitutions.'


'Even many persons who have criticized the concept of judicial review of congressional acts by the federal courts have thought that review of state acts under federal constitutional standards is soundly based in the Supremacy Clause, which makes the Constitution, laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution, and treaties the supreme law of the land, and which Congress effectuated by enacting § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Five years before Marbury v. Madison, the Court held invalid a state law as conflicting with the terms of a treaty, and seven years after Chief Justice Marshall's opinion it voided a state law as conflicting with the Constitution.' ~ FindLaw Staff -- Legally reviewed by Renee Guolee, J.D. | Last reviewed July 05, 2022

https://constitution.findlaw.com/article3/annotation21.html













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*anchor for 'Duties and Origins of Chief Justices'



Duties and Origins of Chief Justices


'Chief Justice is the title of the presiding judge of a supreme court. The term can apply to state or federal chief justices, but is mostly used in reference to the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.'


'At the state level, states may provide for the office of the Chief Justice in their constitution or in other legislation.'

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chief_justice




'The office of chief justice is not explicitly established in the U.S. Constitution. While Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the Constitution refers to a "chief justice" as presiding over Senate trials of presidential impeachment. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which establishes the Supreme Court itself, refers to all members of the Court simply as “judges.” The distinct titles of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States were created by the Judiciary Act of 1789.'


'Since the Constitution mandates only that there must be a chief justice, the practice of appointment by the president with the consent of the Senate has been based solely on tradition. The Constitution does not specifically prohibit the use of other methods, as long as the chief justice is selected from among the other sitting justices.'


'While it's thought the chief justice must swear in ​presidents at inaugurations, this is a purely traditional role. According to law, any federal or state judge is empowered to administer oaths of office, and even a notary public can perform the duty, as was the case when Calvin Coolidge was sworn in as president in 1923.' ~ Robert Longley | Updated on June 03, 2021

https://www.thoughtco.com/chief-justice-of-united-states-duties-3322405




The Role of the Chief Justice [No. 86] ~ The Federalist Society | Jul 12, 2019

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJODkuIACgg




'The title of chief justice is also usually accorded to the presiding judicial officer within any multi-judge court, as well as to the highest judicial officer within a state of the United States. In the United Kingdom the title of lord chief justice is held by the officer presiding over the judiciary of England and Wales.' ~ Brian Duignan

https://www.britannica.com/topic/chief-justice-of-the-Supreme-Court-of-the-United-States




'The Chief Justice of the United States presides over the third branch of the federal government.'


'Chief Justices serve for an average of 13 years.'


.....'there is no formal list of requirements, not even being born an American citizen.'


'Numerous Chief Justices served as state and federal judges, but only five served as Associate Justices before becoming Chief Justice,'


'Responsibilities and duties of the judicial branch’s highest office were not initially clearly defined, but some are now detailed in the U.S. Code.'


'Outside the daily management of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice is the head of the federal judicial branch and its 30,000 employees........This role brings many additional responsibilities, including addressing budgeting and building needs for the federal courts. ...... the Chief Justice serves as the head of the Judicial Conference of the United States and appoints federal judges to specialized courts such as the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. In 1970, Chief Justice Burger added writing the annual report of the federal judiciary to the Chief Justice’s responsibilities.'


'Outside of the judicial branch, the Chief Justice has numerous responsibilities and ceremonial duties. The Chief Justice is the Honorary Chairman of the Board of Trustees for the Supreme Court Historical Society, Chancellor of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, a member of the Board of Trustees of the National Gallery of Art, and the Joseph H. Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, and the National Red Cross.'

https://supremecourthistory.org/supreme-court-civics-resources/role-of-chief-justice-of-the-united-states/




'The job of chief judge or justice calls for an individual not only to see that administrative tasks in the court are carried out, but also to address the needs of the public, attorneys, court staff, and fellow judges.'


'Each judicial district at the state level—in trial courts and in intermediate appeals courts—has a chief judge. He or she is appointed by his or her respective state supreme court. Each state differs on the amount of terms a chief judge may serve and on age restrictions.'


'Chief justices of the state supreme courts act as head of the judiciaries in their states, in addition to serving as a justice on the court.'


'Each state has different laws providing for the selection of its chief justice(s).'

https://ballotpedia.org/Chief_Justice




'Each state within the United States, plus the District of Columbia, has at least one supreme court, or court of last resort. Oklahoma and Texas both have two courts of last resort, one for civil appeals and one for criminal appeals.'


'The supreme courts do not hear trials of cases. They hear appeals of the decisions made in the lower trial or appellate courts.'

https://ballotpedia.org/State_supreme_courts













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*anchor for 'Distrust of Institutions'



Distrust of Institutions


'Last year, Gallup recorded significant declines in public confidence in 11 of the 16 institutions it tracks annually, with the presidency and Supreme Court suffering the most. The share of Americans expressing a great deal or fair amount of confidence in these fell 15 and 11 percentage points, respectively.'


'The five worst-rated institutions -- newspapers, the criminal justice system, television news, big business and Congress -- stir confidence in less than 20% of Americans, with Congress, at 8%, the only one in single digits.'


'Most of the institutions rated this year are within three points of their all-time-low confidence score, including four that are at or tied with their record low. These are the police, public schools, large technology companies and big business.' ~ LYDIA SAAD | JULY 6, 2023

https://news.gallup.com/poll/508169/historically-low-faith-institutions-continues.aspx




'Currently, fewer than two-in-ten Americans say they trust the government in Washington to do what is right “just about always” (1%) or “most of the time” (15%). This is among the lowest trust measures in nearly seven decades of polling. Last year, 20% said they trusted the government just about always or most of the time.' | SEPTEMBER 19, 2023

https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/09/19/public-trust-in-government-1958-2023/




'Just 36% of Americans said they have confidence in higher education. Trust in major U.S. institutions overall has dropped.' ~ April Rubin | Jul 11, 2023

https://www.axios.com/2023/07/11/american-confidence-higher-education-low




'The first is that we should avoid “leveling down” everyone’s quality of life for the purpose of achieving equality. It is unjust when some people have plenty of food while others are starving. But alleviating that inequality by making sure that an even greater number of people starve is clearly wrong.'


'Considerations of “science” also seemed to point in the same direction. As the presentation acknowledged, the likelihood of dying from Covid strongly depends on age. According to the CDC’s model, prioritizing essential workers over the elderly would therefore increase the overall number of deaths by between 0.5% and 6.5%. In other words, it would likely result in the preventable deaths of thousands of Americans.'


'Dooling emphasized that “racial and ethnic minority groups are underrepresented among adults > 65.” In other words, America’s elderly are too white to be considered a top priority for the distribution of the vaccine against Covid.'


'In other words, the CDC was effectively about to recommend that a greater number of African-Americans die so that the share of African-Americans who receive the vaccine is slightly higher.'


'Many of the trends that started on campus have been rapidly taking over established institutions, from Google to the Centers for Disease Control. Perhaps the most dangerous of these is that many professionals now fear to oppose any proposal that is presented, however implausibly, in the language of social justice—even if its foreseeable consequence is to kill a greater number of African-Americans in the name of “ethics.”


'A faithful reader of the newspaper of record would not even know that an important public body was, until it received massive criticism from the public, about to sacrifice thousands of American lives on the altar of a dangerous and deeply illiberal ideology.' ~ YASCHA MOUNK | DEC 23, 2020

https://www.persuasion.community/p/why-im-losing-trust-in-the-institutions




'The survey, which was conducted in August, two months after the Supreme Court overturned the 49-year-old Roe v. Wade ruling guaranteeing a constitutional right to abortion, finds that 53% of U.S. adults disapprove of how the court handles its job. The survey also reveals a chasm between the qualities the American people say they value most in judges, such as fairness and impartiality, and the traits they perceive in Supreme Court justices. '


As written within this treatise earlier: 'For right or wrong reasons, people increasingly distrust our institutions.'


“Whether the perceptions registered in our survey are justified or not, they are worrisome,” said Annenberg Public Policy Center Director Kathleen Hall Jamieson, who has directed the survey since its inception in 2005. “For the court to play its role in our system of government, it is important that it be perceived to be an independent branch that impartially and fairly bases its decisions on the Constitution, the law, and the facts of the case.”


'If voting for a local or state judge, 90% of respondents say that having judges who rule based on the Constitution, the law, and the facts of the case is essential/very important. '


'Roberts told judges and lawyers. “You don’t want the political branches telling you what the law is. And you don’t want public opinion to be the guide of what the appropriate decision is. … But simply because people disagree with an opinion is not a basis for criticizing the legitimacy of the court.'


'Other courts: The lack of trust extends to other parts of the judiciary as well. Asked about how much they trust the federal and state courts, 48% of U.S. adults have a great deal/fair amount of trust, while 51% trust the courts not too much/not at all.'


'Most who see an ideological tilt think it’s bad: Among those who feel the court is generally liberal or conservative, the vast majority (75%) think it is bad for our system of government that the court is generally either of those.'


'Increasing the size of the court: The survey also asked Americans what they thought of proposals to increase the number of justices on the Supreme Court – a proposal that some Democrats and left-leaning critics of the court have said would restore ideological balance to it. In the survey, a plurality of respondents opposed such a proposal.' ~ Annenberg Public Policy Center | 10 OCT 2022


https://www.asc.upenn.edu/news-events/news/over-half-americans-disapprove-supreme-court-trust-plummets




'National Security Agency (NSA) was routinely listening in on American conversations, and the IRS was casually sharing taxpayer records of perceived administration enemies.'


'In 1975, a bipartisan special Senate committee colloquially known as the “Church Committee” was formed and subsequently exposed all these adventurous executive branch excesses.'


'First, any high-profile investigation involving political campaigns, candidates and political figures should be subject to objective General Counsel review to ensure adequate predication required by the Attorney General Guidelines is clearly present in order to avoid another Crossfire Hurricane debacle. Contrary to Inspector General assertions, the Crossfire Hurricane case file articulated no basis for legitimate initiation required by the guidelines.'


'Third, arrest and search plans involving politically sensitive suspects should undergo prior review by an independent entity within the FBI to ensure that the level of tactical response fits the violation and relative risk presented by the subject. Safety is important but so is a response strategy that doesn’t foster perceptions of heavy-handedness, if not extrajudicial punishment or “message sending.” ~ KEVIN R. BROCK | 11/01/22 9:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/3709916-what-should-become-of-the-fbi/




'Four in five respondents in a July 2023 Trafalgar poll saw a “two-tiered system of justice,” in which “politicians and Washington D.C. insiders” receive better treatment than “everyday Americans.” Further, many Republicans believe that the Justice Department and FBI have targeted former president Donald Trump for investigation while handling President Joe Biden and his family with kid gloves.'


'Meantime, Swecker notes, FBI recruits have become more educated, more opinionated, more idealistic—and more liberal. Instead of following the facts of a case, modern recruits are more prone to insert their opinions into investigations. Swecker blames “indoctrination” by the elite universities from which FBI agents increasingly have graduated.'


'The Justice Department conflates angry parents at school board meetings and “domestic terrorists”; an intelligence product generated in the FBI’s Richmond field office warns of “radical-traditionalist” Catholics; an FBI whistleblower testifies about artificially inflated domestic terrorism data related to January 6 cases. All these examples suggest ideological corruption of the FBI’s core mission.' ~ James A. Gagliano | Nov 17 2023

https://www.city-journal.org/article/fix-the-fbi













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*anchor for 'Judiciary on Criminal Cases: Prosecution or Persecution?'



Judiciary on Criminal Cases: Prosecution or Persecution?


'In any given year, 98% of criminal cases in the federal courts end with a plea bargain — a practice that prizes efficiency over fairness and innocence, according to a new report from the American Bar Association.'


'Aside from the paltry number of trials in the federal system, states including Pennsylvania, Texas and New York have trial rates of less than 3%. In Santa Cruz County, Ariz., there were no trials from 2010 to 2012, the report said.'


'The prevalence of plea bargaining exploded in the last several decades as a way to save money and time and to promote more certainty in outcomes. But the practice comes with "a very high cost," said Lucian Dervan, a professor at Belmont University College of Law in Nashville.' ~ Carrie Johnson | FEBRUARY 22, 2023 5:00 AM ET

https://www.npr.org/2023/02/22/1158356619/plea-bargains-criminal-cases-justice




'Currently federal prosecutors tout above a 95% conviction rate. This is primarily due to the fact that most cases never make it to trial. Most defendants end up taking a plea bargain rather then risk a potentially much greater prison sentence which could be dealt them if they actual went to trial and lost. Another factor is the empowerment and impunity given to both investigating authorities and prosecutors, along with an interesting trial maneuver called “Jury Instructions”. Jury instructions are basically parameters that the judge provides the jury which can greatly affect the outcome of a verdict.'


'Justice is a primary credo among investigators and prosecutors as an overall convention, nevertheless, there are also personal and professional objectives to consider. Every conviction, every arrest, as well the total dollar or quantitative amounts involved are points which help move investigators and prosecutors up the career ladder. Their positions are very subjective in that they are empowered with such discretion and impunity within the federal prosecutorial system. For example, it is usually up to the prosecutor to decide who will be prosecuted and who will not within a multi-defendant investigation. So while multiple individuals may have participated in a federal crime, some may be charged while other may not – the selection can be based on a personal tactical strategy, or esoteric reasons such as personality conflicts.'

https://www.hmichaelsteinberg.com/if-you-are-charged-with-a-federal-crime.html




'In fiscal year 2022, only 290 of 71,954 defendants in federal criminal cases – about 0.4% – went to trial and were acquitted, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of the latest available statistics from the federal judiciary. Another 1,379 went to trial and were found guilty (1.9%).'


'A chart that shows trials are rare in the federal criminal justice system, and acquittals are even rarer. The overwhelming majority of defendants in federal criminal cases that year did not go to trial at all. About nine-in-ten (89.5%) pleaded guilty, while another 8.2% had their case dismissed at some point in the judicial process, according to the data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.'


'These statistics include all defendants charged in U.S. district courts with felonies and serious misdemeanors, as well as some defendants charged with petty offenses. They do not include federal defendants whose cases were handled by magistrate judges or the much broader universe of defendants in state courts. Defendants who entered pleas of “no contest,” in which they accept criminal punishment but do not admit guilt, are also excluded. The 2022 federal fiscal year began Oct. 1, 2021, and ended Sept. 30, 2022.' ~ JOHN GRAMLICH | JUNE 14, 2023

https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/06/14/fewer-than-1-of-defendants-in-federal-criminal-cases-were-acquitted-in-2022/




'However, the federal government can also enforce federal criminal laws that deal with national or federal issues, including crimes that affect interstate commerce, those that cross state lines, crimes committed on federal property or Native American reservations, and those committed against the federal government and its agencies.'


'In addition to different bodies of law, federal and state crimes also differ based on which agencies investigate and prosecute them. The President of the United States holds the ultimate authority to enforce federal laws and delegates this authority to various federal agencies, including the FBI, ATF, DHS, SEC, and the Secret Service.'

'People who are convicted of federal crimes are sent to federal prison instead of state prison.'


'Since the federal government and federal prosecutors generally have more resources and staff available to devote to federal prosecution, defending against federal charges can be more difficult.'


'By contrast, people have fewer protections against being prosecuted for the same criminal conduct under federal law, and nothing precludes the federal government from prosecuting someone who has been prosecuted for the same crimes under state law.' ~ DiCindio Law LLC | November 22, 2021

https://www.dicindiolaw.com/blog/what-makes-federal-charges-more-severe-than-state-charges/




'Due to federalism, both the federal government and each of the state governments have their own court systems.'


'State courts are the final arbiters of state laws and constitutions. Their interpretation of federal law or the U.S. Constitution may be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may choose to hear or not to hear such cases.'

https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure/comparing-federal-state-courts




'What is the problem with prosecutors, and how do we fix it? Answering those questions has been difficult, in part because there are at least seven different problems with American prosecutors. Six of those problems are relatively familiar: the power of prosecutors, the discretion they exercise, the illegality in which they too often are found to have engaged, the punitive ideology that shapes many of their practices, their often-frustrating unaccountability, and organizational inertia within prosecutors’ offices. These problems intersect, so they are difficult to address separately. The seventh problem is discussed less often but may be the most basic: the ambiguity of the prosecutor's role. That problem needs to be understood as well if progress is to be made addressing the other six.'


'Legal scholars blame prosecutors for overcrowded prisons, out-of-control snitches, and racially lopsided justice. Activists charge prosecutors with protecting trigger-happy cops. A former prosecutor concludes that no one of good conscience should want the job. There is a broad and growing sense that prosecutors in the United States are a problem—quite possibly the most pressing challenge in American criminal justice.'


'American prosecutors remain distinctive in many respects, some pertaining to the power and discretion they wield, some pertaining to the peculiar United States tradition of selecting head prosecutors by popular vote.'


'Seventy-five years ago, Robert Jackson, then Attorney General of the United States, warned in a now-famous speech that “[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.”


'Prosecutors traditionally have exercised authority only within the sphere of criminal proceedings and only over actual or potential criminal defendants. For that reason, many, if not most, people do not imagine that they may be subject to prosecutorial power, and they have limited sympathy for the people they suppose will wind up in that category. That factor may have made the concentration of power in the hands of prosecutors more acceptable.'


'Instead of “discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for the man who has committed it … picking the man and then searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on him.”


'Prosecutors have no legal obligation to file charges that they believe are proportionate to the defendant's culpability, nor is there any legal limit on the “discounts” prosecutors can offer in exchange for a defendant's guilty plea—or, viewed another way, the penalty prosecutors can impose for a defendant's insistence on going to trial.'


'Supreme Court has never made clear whether Brady obligations apply at all in cases that are resolved by a plea agreement rather than a trial.'


'A prosecutor's refusal to make a plea offer is virtually immune from judicial review, and courts will not intervene to prevent prosecutors from seeking severe sanctions in retaliation for a defendant's decision not to plead guilty.'


'District attorneys are reelected at very high rates and often run unopposed. Moreover, campaign rhetoric in district attorney races has traditionally focused less on policies than on issues of character.'


'One factor that may keep the number of upsets small is the limited information that voters typically have about a district attorney's performance. Even more important may be the lack of any consensus about what information voters should want.'


'With a few exceptions, prosecutors’ offices are far less welcoming than police departments to outside researchers or to criticisms or suggestions from outsiders about how they should do their work.'


'It has been common since the 1960s for scholars to analogize prosecutors’ offices to administrative agencies and to seek from prosecutors some of the procedural protections against arbitrariness that administrative law imposes on regulatory agencies.'


'To the extent that elections have any influence at all on how prosecutors do their jobs, the effect seems to be that prosecutors become more hawkish as elections approach, for fear of being labeled “soft on crime”.


'Nonetheless, there is reasonably broad agreement about some desiderata for prosecutors—energy, legal skill, evenhandedness, proportionality, respectful treatment of victims, and constitutional compliance—and about some things we want prosecutors to avoid—vindictiveness, incompetence, partiality, and deception.' ~ David Alan Sklansky | Volume publication date January 2018 :: First published as a Review in Advance on September 25, 2017

https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-criminol-032317-092440#abstractSection













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Commonwealth Party
Supreme Court Reform
March 22, 2024