BICAMERAL
ELECTORAL COLLEGE
REFORM





Revitalizing Presidential Selection



Capitol from State St. in Madison, WI











THERE CAN BE NO POLITICAL REFORM
UNTIL THERE IS ELECTORAL REFORM


















Revised: 5/3/21






*anchor for index*

OUTLINE / INDEX:








SUMMARY



BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE I


  • Intro
  • Checks, Balances, Legislatures
  • Powers of Representation
  • Popular Vote By Districts or Statewide Proportions?
  • Overview and Our Demand
  • Obtaining New Legislature's Input
  • TAKE SPECIAL NOTE OF THIS


BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE II


  • The Range Vote
  • Justification for an Alternative Pact
  • Converting to All Whole Electors


BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE III


  • Considering the Intrastate Popular & Legislative Elector Proportions



COMPARISON TABLE: BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE PLANS, NPV & CURRENT SITUATION


  • Table: ELECTORAL COLLEGE METHODS COMPARED
  • Comparison Table Analysis


GENERAL ELECTION RANGE VOTE & BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE

  • Statewide Popular Range Vote, No Districts
  • Statewide Popular Range Vote With Districts
  • Finishing It Off -- But Wait! -- Gotta Keep Everything Half Legislative, Half Popular
  • Statewide Popular Range Votes Mixed -- When Some States Do, Others Do Not Incorporate Districts-Won-By-Candidates




CONSIDERATIONS




SIMULATIONS USING THE 2020 ELECTION

  • Table: 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BICAM III SIMULATION (USING TWO-PARTY, RELATIVE POPULAR PROPORTIONS ONLY)

  • Table: 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BICAM III SIMULATION (USING MULTI-PARTY, ACTUAL POPULAR PROPORTIONS ONLY)



LINKS







Re-Scroll







Top Bottom






*** anchor for summary link ****








SUMMARY


Here is a list of attributes of the Bicameral Electoral College Plans:



* Depending on the population of your state, your state my gain or lose electors in Bicameral Electoral College Plans II and III. However, Bicameral Electoral College I keeps the same elector allocations in terms of number that we have now.

* One half of the electoral college is reserved for the popular vote and the other half for state legislatures. For a general election range vote, the overall input and any embedded districts are half popular and half state legislative.

* Bicam II and III introduce near congressional weightings for each state via interstate sharing. This will result in fractional and partial elector allocations, but all electors will be combined and swapped amongst the states to facilitate a process awarding all electors as whole electors.

* The Constitution's original elector allocations will reflect the result of whatever version used via each state assigning its current electors in such a manner that the Bicameral Electoral College effectively determines a winner.

* Presidential debates in various state legislatures will introduce state issues to presidential selection.

* Encourages all campaigns to vie in all states at various levels including state legislatures which results in better national executive governance.

* More consequential voice within all states activates campaign donations and spending in currently dormant media markets.

* Restoration of Senate appointments and implementation of state-based gubernatorial electoral colleges are recommended





It is now important that the state legislatures consider these compensational maneuvers in the selection of presidential electors to facilitate better governance from the victor. Please take the time to study the plan and its nuances. You will need to know the points to argue for it on your debate floors.




Thanks for your time.







Re-Scroll









Top Index Bottom










*** anchor for bicam1 link ****


BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE I





Intro

First some background: The legislative branch is composed of two houses -- the House of Representatives which allocates representation to each state dependent upon population and the Senate which allows each state to have an equal number of senators, namely two. All legislation must pass approval by both houses and must be signed by the president to become effective law. The president can veto legislation denying its passage, but the veto can be overridden by a 2/3 majority of the Congress via both houses. Such is part of the system of 'checks and balances' that keeps our government self-regulating against undue powers and tyranny or at least impeding them (in theory at least).

Having a Senate and a House of Representatives as described above was a compromise which kept small states from being totally drowned-out when voting on national laws while still retaining the just advantage of more populous states in their having greater net representation in the national congress. This bicameral compromise addresses both concerns and splits Congress half-and-half. Each house has a say on national legislation and each effectively has half of the power of Congress when it comes to the passage of laws. One house votes with states as equals and the other house with states allotted votes according to population brackets.



Checks, Balances, Legislatures

Now if you oppose the electoral college, then you are also opposing semblance to the nifty House and Senate compromise. This is because the electoral college allocates to each state a number of electors for choosing the president which is equal to the number of senators and representatives that state has by both houses. Plus if you oppose the electoral college, you oppose the electoral college's possible intermediary checks and balances on the electorate. Why would we not employ such principles in choosing a national leader?

Note that the Constitution grants every state legislature the sole power to determine how those allocated electors are selected on behalf of their state to the electoral college. State legislatures used to appoint U.S. Senators and they ratify amendments to our constitution. Thus legislatures have intended function at the federal level. Until 1824, over a quarter of state legislatures were choosing presidential electors as opposed to having a statewide popular vote. Our earliest presidential races had substantially higher proportions doing the same.

As the archival presidential elections show, the founders desired not just checks and balances between government branches, but they also wanted checks and balances between government and the people as well -- functioning in both directions. This is because the founders knew the citizens and elections could be swayed by radicals and mass movements possibly of tyrants or anti-Christ figures. An electoral college would possibly serve as an obstacle or delay to the acquiring of the presidency by such individuals since electors do not hold office of trust or profit under the U.S., nor are they the people or legislatures voting directly. They can opt to act on their own accord thus serving as an intermediary check on presidential prospects. So when someone is about to essentially become a third of our national (federal) government, shouldn't this system of checks be utilized on their acquisition of power? Shouldn't that choice be subdivided by states and state governments just like our federalized national government structure was intended?

The privilege granted to you to vote for electoral college electors is an accommodation of your state legislature who feels you can be trusted at this time and thinks the masses are of stable enough mind, within sound reason and perceives the society as functionable and at relative peace. However, with today's goings on you have to begin to wonder if this is still a valid perspective or if ever allowing a popular vote to solely determine the president should ever have been dabbled with.

As stated above, the checks and balances can work in reverse direction as well. Say if a group of electors were chosen by a state legislature and that group votes against a candidate where the people feel all this was done in an air of frivolity or without due regard, the people will focus their punishment on the state legislature in its election. Ideally, legislators with scruples would more likely only take such risk of retaliation if they felt that the people's interests were bent or the Republic faced trouble with a prospective national leader.



Powers of Representation

Before trying to do away with our important electoral college check, consider Canada. They determine their prime minister through the majority or by the plurality of seats won by a particular party in the representative house. While they do have a senate, the representative body is usually where the prime minister is derived from. Since this house is based on population, the national leader and the executive direction can solely be determined by the more populated eastern provinces while the western provinces garner substantially less influence. Thus, their national leaders are more skewed towards the views and concerns of the big east provinces. This is one reason there has been secession sentiments and movements in western Canada. Without more electoral college balance, America may suffer in a similar fashion with New York, California, Texas, Florida and several other big states mostly determining the outcome for president. It would be worse than it is now without an electoral college to give some boost to the smaller states. Actually, the current electoral college form usually does agree with the popular vote's outcome most of the time except for a few occasions. So why should popular vote purists bother to get rid of it altogether? The few times it has diverted from the popular vote it was probably a needed check to do so.

If you wish to complain about the electoral college, you should do so by focusing on the method your state legislature allows for elector selection. Most states employ the all-or-nothing mode whereby all electors to the electoral college for a state are unanimously determined by winner of the state's popular vote. There is some perceived strategy to having all-or-nothing within the current system. It will make candidates for president cater more strongly to the general interests of your state or its majority in order to get all your state's electoral votes. If your state is a smaller state it can make you more noticeable against the larger states within that system. However, what if an opposing candidate wins? If that candidate only has support of the minority in your state, they will have less incentive to accommodate your state in governing or campaigning next time around. If it is not sufficiently close in your state, will they opt to campaign in other states with closer races instead of vying for yours? Will candidates see your state as one big blob and carry a watered-down, disingenuous, common-denominator stance towards you or would it be better if they could appeal more to the various regional issues in your state? You may wish to consider the pros and cons as there are many possible outcomes.

Technically, perhaps the current all-or-nothing system may have been thought of as a safety back in the day when travel was harsh, there were no instantaneous mass communications and there were no computers. Today however, all of these amenities exist. Campaigns can travel anywhere quickly and the issues are more exposed to the masses. Ballots can be counted quicker and easier. So there is less cause to grant unanimous electors for each state. Thus the more regional interests can be allowed to shape races and hold their sway in close or not-so-close elections. If we were awarding a state's allocated electors by some kind of proportional showings, candidates would take interest somewhere in your state whether or not their statewide polling was sufficiently beyond 50% as in today's system.

For improvement, we encourage each state to select its allotted electors by allowing half to be determined by the state legislature's proportioned results. The other half would be chosen popularly through either congressional (or smaller) districts or just the popular statewide vote. The former by district can be more of a demographic method that reflects political distribution and densities influenced by trends or infrastructure. It may indicate how a state politically operates at a closer level through the majorities of regional communities on the ground.



Popular Vote By Districts or Statewide Proportions?

The district method provides an incentive for candidates to address concerns parsed through non-sovereign entities of equal populations within a state which can reflect the weight of regional issues. From a national vantage point, it is noticeably different from having vast sovereign states of various sizes each acting as a unanimous blob to their lowest common-denominator as we do now. However, the district method could as well conceivably make a state act more as a blob in a case where a vast majority of the districts as drawn favor one candidate against any of the others -- much more than the statewide popular vote would. Thus, overlaying the statewide popular vote result on the popular electors is still an option which acts as a counter to the concerns of gerrymandering. This also caters more to the voice of each individual voter. Then again, results by districts help insulate against drawn-out controversies of a close national election where the general fluidity of a collection of statewide popular votes invites quibbling over the final result everywhere. Using districts limits the contesting of such close elections to within relatively fewer prefectures. Perhaps in order to get the best of both worlds, half of the popularly allocated electors could be determined by overlaying the statewide popular vote and the other half by overlaying ratios of districts won by candidates. Both of these overlays will occupy their own quarter of the total electoral college.

Should some electors be chosen by a governor? It is interesting in itself to debate the possibilities.



Overview and Our Demand

The advantages to this plan are substantial for consideration. The nation would less likely be held hostage to just a few swing states during close elections. The several states would be more empowered because electors from each state are also allocated to state legislatures which brings state concerns and issues to the table. The legislatures' choice and a possible popular vote by districts in each state can put more emphasis on regional topics. Also the smaller several states have a greater number (and perhaps proportion) of state governments for candidates to contend with and to be discerned by as opposed to just dealing with the fewer larger states' popular vote bloc. State legislators gain with their races garnering more attention since they will have an effect on presidential outcomes which means voters have even more incentive to turn out for state-level elections. Overall, voters are more adequately and consistently represented using the intrastate conjunction of a proportional statewide popular vote or a district-by-district popular vote along with the voter-determined state legislators choosing electors. This is opposed to the current all-or-nothing elector slate by the popular vote result across a state currently in use which gives no electoral voice to the minority or legislature.

There is a caveat to our plan. Originally, the U.S. Senate was intended to be comprised of senators who were chosen by state legislatures so that state governments would have some representation within Congress plus a check and balance with the direct representatives of the people elected to the House. Today, we have no such thing since we elect senators by popular vote. Despite the Senate having some unique impeachment and other functions, it's popular make-up basically makes for a congressional two-house redundancy by motives. As well, wouldn't Senate appointments by state legislatures also lessen the number of large statewide, big-money campaigns that many complain about?

With the case being that the general populace has total monopoly in voting for the legislative and executive branches and perhaps until we re-establish state legislative appointment of U.S. senators, the electoral college should be determined totally by state legislatures. State legislatures need some amount of voice and power returned to them at the federal level. Once senatorial appointment is resumed, then our aforementioned plan of combining popular vote electors with legislature-determined electors half-and-half by state would be initiated.

(During the period of state legislatures' totality, you will still have some voice towards presidential selection because you determine the make-up of your state legislature. As noted above, popular votes determine 2/3 of the national government's branches and indirectly determine the remaining third which gives the state legislatures nil at 0/3. By our proposed caveat, we would at least re-balance the executive and legislative branches.)

At any rate, we support the preservation of the electoral college while considering revamping it at state level. Our way (Bicam I) is by splitting each current state elector slate with one half to the state legislature and the other half to either the statewide popular vote or its popular district-by-district vote (or perhaps a quarter for each) after the caveat period of all electors being chosen only by state legislatures ends. In any case, the elector slate is overlaid with the respective vote-result proportions. All the matching elector tallies for each candidate are combined yielding the most whole electors possible. Any mixed-share electors left over are mutually settled, rounded off or default to certain methods in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct in order to yield all whole-elector tallies for the state.

Obtaining New Legislature's Input

In order to get the upcoming legislature's vote for president in the concurrent election, the presidential vote of the returning incumbents and the legislators-elect will be gathered nearer the end of election day or whenever the chads are cleared in the few, usually occurring close races. The final contested electors and mixed-elector subsets will be determined by a deadline before the electoral college meets in December. Nonetheless, projections can be made with most state legislative races called nearer end of election day.




TAKE SPECIAL NOTE OF THIS: We consider the current times to be thwarted, skewed and have long been unfairly biased in favor of the Republican and Democrat candidates for decades through government campaign funding and manipulated ballot access. Thus to make up for all the years of untrue elections, we believe it fair and proper that for the next presidential election all of you pressure your state legislatures to allow only the selection of third-party and independent electors for president (or at least vice president) in the electoral college. This is on account of the long past and current electoral grievances. This would be a proper, compensatory check and balance.







Re-Scroll









Top Index Bottom












*** anchor for bicam2 link ****

ADDENDUM:



BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE II







The Range Vote

As we delve further into the Bicameral Electoral College we will see that one of its functions makes use of what is known as the range vote. A range vote or what may be referred to in some circles as a score vote is a voting system where a series of competitors are rated on a scale by an audience. The most recognizable example is probably at the Olympics where for certain events athletes perform some routine and are evaluated by a panel of judges and they receive ratings from 0 to 10 by each judge. An athlete's ratings from each judge are then added together and divided by the number of ratings to give an average. The athlete with the highest average rating receives a gold medal. In races for political office, candidates take place of the athletes and voters take place of the judges. When a candidate is not known well enough to a voter or a voter has no opinion about the candidate, the voter is allowed to cast what basically amounts to an 'n/a' which will not affect the average the candidate derives from voters who do rate him/her. The candidate with the highest average will win office but they must have received some threshold number of ratings or actionable input in order to do so.

One advantage of the range vote over our current system (plurality vote) is that it allows each voter to rate each candidate on a relative scale from best to worst or even cast a 'Not sure', all of which gives a much better picture of how the voter thinks about all the candidates. It allows a voter to more honestly indicate their preferences without worrying about wasting their vote on a more favored ideal underdog who has little chance of winning. So instead of being hen-pecked into casting their one-and-only single vote for the more electable, lesser evil -- they can instead rate their good underdog candidate as high or higher than their safe, lesser evil candidate in the current system. This rids our elections of the spoiler effect making it possible for independents and third parties to have a competitive chance at winning. The election outcome can be a more pleasant surprise as the fear of the electorate over wasting their vote dissipates and more ideal underdogs can win who have real appeal to their supporters versus the same-old, binary establishment evil-doers. Even if your ideal underdog or even your established safe candidate does not win, there is a greater chance that some other second choice or at least a more agreeable candidate wins as opposed to always getting your most divisive, greater evil when defeated.

The range vote is not the same as ranked-choice voting / instant-runoff voting. Range voting is superior and has been reported as more adaptable to ballot machines.

With this in mind we proceed......



Justification for an Alternative Pact

A sizeable number of state legislatures are considering a pact where enough states would choose presidential electors such that the electoral college majority merely reflects a national popular vote winner. The pact takes effect when at least half of all the electors are involved, thereby nullifying a win by the electoral college's current state-by-state, unanimous elector slates each awarded to their own popular vote winner. The arguments for the National Popular Vote pact are that swing states of the current system beckon too much influence and that the current all-or-nothing allocation of electors by each state does not reflect a particular state's voter proportions. They also argue that the smaller states are still too overshadowed by the larger states. We agree about the first two of these current system disadvantages and thus have instituted our own electoral college proposal above. We also concur over the third concern about smaller state representations within the current nominal allocations of electors. However, one reason why the electoral college exists to begin with is to compensate for the smaller state representations. It boosts the proportional share of votes for the smaller states by allocating two base electors for every state (by Senate representation) alongside the population-based elector allocations (by number of House representatives). Resorting to a national popular vote will in fact erase that extra boost for the smaller states. Obviously, a popular vote will cater even more to the larger states proportion-wise since they have larger populations and thus more votes weighted in a popular election.

Therefore, if there is going to be a pact amongst the states as far as how they will choose their electors then let's have them allocate their CURRENT SLATES OF ELECTORS state by state in such a manner that half of the RESULTING TOTAL ELECTORS will represent the state legislatures' ( & D.C. Council's) tallies for president on an equal basis. The other half of the total electors will simply reflect the popular vote tallies of the states ( & D.C.) with state proportions near to matching the relative House allocations. State popular tallies will be determined by candidates' number of won congressional (or smaller) districts or by statewide popular vote tallies or to get the best of both worlds allot one quarter of the total electors to districts won by candidates, the other quarter by statewide popular vote tallies. Overlaying these popular and state legislative results over the total electors in such proportions will make for whole & fractional electors (by virtual spillovers between the current slates) & partial and mixed-share electors (by exact candidate shares). We then determine the final assignments to the various candidates in whole electors as described in the following section.

***anchor for link to 'Converting to All...' ****

Converting to All Whole Electors

All whole, fractional, partial and mixed-share elector allocation results of the states ( & D.C.) will be combined, swapped and sorted until reaching the highest possible number of wholly claimed electors for each candidate plus each one's largest possible partial elector. From all the mixed-share electors remaining, mutually constructed subsets each holding candidate shares reflecting more strategically cooperative campaigns can be made with each spanning a whole number of electors. From such subsets, the electors within those subsets can be assigned as to how the campaigns involved mutually agree.

One method they may agree or default to in assigning those electors is ranging the subset. This process entails a range vote survey which is really just a rating of all the presidential candidates in the form of a mock range vote. It is taken ideally by each of all the presidential candidates or by a satisfactory number of a presidential candidate's electors beforehand in order to obtain a template result. Such a template reflects what the average elector for a candidate feels about all the presidential candidates and that template can be used in lieu of their presidential candidate's input. When subsets are constructed and they are to be ranged, we treat them as districts holding a range vote. Only the inputs from the range vote survey concerning the candidates in that subset are used. Just the ratings by and upon the candidates in the subset are applied and weighted by the relative partial shares the candidates have in the subset. All this mimics a district holding a range vote for president with average electors (or clones of the involved candidates) showing up in respective numbers that correlate to the candidates' subset shares. This awards the whole elector slots of the subset to the most favored or most representative candidate as seen by the perspectives, interests and constituent proportions of the member candidates. Of course, the winning campaign of the subset can negotiate or donate their awarded electors as they please.

After completing the ranging process, any contended leading ties in subsets will be settled according to who has the best showing in the overall electorate (as in the showing before any of the mixed-share elector subsets were awarded).* If that does not settle it then the House of Representatives will reward the subset's electors to one of those tied candidates through a quorum analogous to Amendment XII (via resolution perhaps). Should the tie involve more than three candidates, the House as a usual body will whittle the list down to three before carrying out the quorum. Ranging will also be applied by default to all the leftover, mixed-share electors not taken for subsets barring any mutual compromise of the candidates involved. Such mixed-share electors will be ranged as one set. When any set or subsets are found to be undeterminable (or not determinable enough) when being ranged due to lack of information submitted in the range vote survey -- again barring any compromise mutually agreed to by their candidate campaigns -- the House of Representatives quorum in Amendment XII will here too be set upon at most three candidates of the set in question who are chosen by the House as a usual body beforehand when more than three were initially involved.

Note: After combining, swapping and sorting the elector allocation results of the states ( & D.C.) to reach the highest possible number of wholly claimed electors for each candidate plus each one's largest possible partial elector and before any subsets are mutually constructed, the maximum number of mixed-share electors will be N-1 where N is the number of candidates with electoral college shares.





*For those of you referred back here from the further down sections in 'GENERAL ELECTION RANGE VOTE & BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE', a more applicable and precise text to use in lieu of the asterisked sentence above will read:


'After completing the ranging process, any contended leading ties in subsets will be settled according to who has the most overlay in the whole electoral college (as in the overlay before any of the mixed-share elector subsets were awarded). Next any remaining tied candidates are settled by who has the highest rank possession of popular range vote inputs. However, when there is a mix of states having range votes and others plurality, before advancing to the next criteria it is possible we go by the tied candidate who has the highest rank possession of popular range vote inputs from the range vote states' popular components. This is as long as a proper mix of states, ballot access, candidate participation in popular range votes and sufficient number of range vote ballots amongst the relevant candidates all occurred that meets the statistical satisfaction of the purveyors of the range vote.'






Re-Scroll









Top Index Bottom











*** anchor for bicam3 link ****


BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE III





Considering the Intrastate Popular & Legislative Elector Proportions

Bicam II is a good system since it gives the states about the same amount of representation in the electoral college that they have in the Congress. However, considering that the smaller states popular vote is squelched by their noticeably larger legislative vote and vice versa for the larger states -- we accordingly put forth this Bicameral Electoral College III.

Bicameral Electoral College III will be a combination of Bicam I and Bicam II that gives the same overall electoral allocations to the states as Bicam II but gives equal voice to the legislative and popular vote within each state like in Bicam I. As in Bicam II, the total standing given to each state is almost what it is in Congress since D.C. gets an electoral share through Amendment XXIII. The national total electoral vote is still half-and-half state legislative and popular as it was in both Bicam I & II. In Bicam III the smaller states' popular vote is enhanced and the larger states' legislative vote is enhanced relative to Bicam II. This makes certain popular or legislative voices more competitive within a state and state to state. With both voting blocs equal within each state, they get the same consideration in terms of size by a president or presidential candidate vying for that state.

Some individual states may opt to return to their inner Bicam II legislative and popular proportions for whatever reasons (gerrymandering issues, countering corruption in a legislature, voter irregularities). This is okay here and there. A little variance is good and may keep things interesting and the candidates on their toes.












Top Index Bottom














*** anchor for comparison table link ****

COMPARISON TABLE: BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE PLANS, NPV & CURRENT SITUATION



Putting the current electoral college allotment alongside the National Popular Vote (NPV) and our Bicams helps us to see what has been proposed so far.







ELECTORAL COLLEGE METHODS COMPARED:






State

Bicam I Electors


Current All-Or-Nothing Electors

[ Proposed Nominal State Legislative / Popular Elector Halves ]



Approx. Effective Electors for National Popular Vote*




Bicam II Electors


Allotted Electors

( State Legislative Electors + Popular Electors )


Bicam III Electors


Allotted Electors

[ State Legislative / Popular Elector Halves ]

AL 9 [ 4.50 ] 8.66 9.59 ( 5.27 + 4.32 ) 9.59 [ 4.79 ]
AK 3 [ 1.50 ] 1.24 5.89 ( 5.27 + 0.62 ) 5.89 [ 2.94 ]
AZ 11 [ 5.50 ] 11.13 10.83 ( 5.27 + 5.56 ) 10.83 [ 5.41 ]
AR 6 [ 3.00 ] 4.95 7.74 ( 5.27 + 2.47 ) 7.74 [ 3.87 ]
CA 55 [ 27.50 ] 65.55 37.97 ( 5.27 + 32.70 ) 37.97 [ 18.98 ]
CO 9 [ 4.50 ] 8.66 9.59 ( 5.27 + 4.32 ) 9.59 [ 4.79 ]
CT 7 [ 3.50 ] 6.18 8.36 ( 5.27 + 3.09 ) 8.36 [ 4.18 ]
DE 3 [ 1.50 ] 1.24 5.89 ( 5.27 + 0.62 ) 5.89 [ 2.94 ]
FL 29 [ 14.50 ] 33.39 21.93 ( 5.27 + 16.66 ) 21.93 [ 10.96 ]
GA 16 [ 8.00 ] 17.31 13.91 ( 5.27 + 8.64 ) 13.91 [ 6.95 ]
HI 4 [ 2.00 ] 2.47 6.51 ( 5.27 + 1.24 ) 6.51 [ 3.25 ]
ID 4 [ 2.00 ] 2.47 6.51 ( 5.27 + 1.24 ) 6.51 [ 3.25 ]
IL 20 [ 10.00 ] 22.26 16.38 ( 5.27 + 11.11 ) 16.38 [ 8.19 ]
IN 11 [ 5.50 ] 11.13 10.83 ( 5.27 + 5.56 ) 10.83 [ 5.41 ]
IA 6 [ 3.00 ] 4.95 7.74 ( 5.27 + 2.47 ) 7.74 [ 3.87 ]
KS 6 [ 3.00 ] 4.95 7.74 ( 5.27 + 2.47 ) 7.74 [ 3.87 ]
KY 8 [ 4.00 ] 7.42 8.98 ( 5.27 + 3.71 ) 8.98 [ 4.49 ]
LA 8 [ 4.00 ] 7.42 8.98 ( 5.27 + 3.71 ) 8.98 [ 4.49 ]
ME 4 [ 2.00 ] 2.47 6.51 ( 5.27 + 1.24 ) 6.51 [ 3.25 ]
MD 10 [ 5.00 ] 9.89 10.21 ( 5.27 + 4.94 ) 10.21 [ 5.10 ]
MA 11 [ 5.50 ] 11.13 10.83 ( 5.27 + 5.56 ) 10.83 [ 5.41 ]
MI 16 [ 8.00 ] 17.31 13.91 ( 5.27 + 8.64 ) 13.91 [ 6.95 ]
MN 10 [ 5.00 ] 9.89 10.21 ( 5.27 + 4.94 ) 10.21 [ 5.10 ]
MS 6 [ 3.00 ] 4.95 7.74 ( 5.27 + 2.47 ) 7.74 [ 3.87 ]
MO 10 [ 5.00 ] 9.89 10.21 ( 5.27 + 4.94 ) 10.21 [ 5.10 ]
MT 3 [ 1.50 ] 1.24 5.89 ( 5.27 + 0.62 ) 5.89 [ 2.94 ]
NE 5 [ 2.50 ] 3.71 7.13 ( 5.27 + 1.86 ) 7.13 [ 3.56 ]
NV 6 [ 3.00 ] 4.95 7.74 ( 5.27 + 2.47 ) 7.74 [ 3.87 ]
NH 4 [ 2.00 ] 2.47 6.51 ( 5.27 + 1.24 ) 6.51 [ 3.25 ]
NJ 14 [ 7.00 ] 14.84 12.68 ( 5.27 + 7.41 ) 12.68 [ 6.34 ]
NM 5 [ 2.50 ] 3.71 7.13 ( 5.27 + 1.86 ) 7.13 [ 3.56 ]
NY 29 [ 14.50 ] 33.39 21.93 ( 5.27 + 16.66 ) 21.93 [ 10.96 ]
NC 15 [ 7.50 ] 16.08 13.30 ( 5.27 + 8.03 ) 13.30 [ 6.65 ]
ND 3 [ 1.50 ] 1.24 5.89 ( 5.27 + 0.62 ) 5.89 [ 2.94 ]
OH 18 [ 9.00 ] 19.79 15.15 ( 5.27 + 9.88 ) 15.15 [ 7.57 ]
OK 7 [ 3.50 ] 6.18 8.36 ( 5.27 + 3.09 ) 8.36 [ 4.18 ]
OR 7 [ 3.50 ] 6.18 8.36 ( 5.27 + 3.09 ) 8.36 [ 4.18 ]
PA 20 [ 10.00 ] 22.26 16.38 ( 5.27 + 11.11 ) 16.38 [ 8.19 ]
RI 4 [ 2.00 ] 2.47 6.51 ( 5.27 + 1.24 ) 6.51 [ 3.25 ]
SC 9 [ 4.50 ] 8.66 9.59 ( 5.27 + 4.32 ) 9.59 [ 4.79 ]
SD 3 [ 1.50 ] 1.24 5.89 ( 5.27 + 0.62 ) 5.89 [ 2.94 ]
TN 11 [ 5.50 ] 11.13 10.83 ( 5.27 + 5.56 ) 10.83 [ 5.41 ]
TX 38 [ 19.00 ] 44.52 27.49 ( 5.27 + 22.22 ) 27.49 [ 13.74 ]
UT 6 [ 3.00 ] 4.95 7.74 ( 5.27 + 2.47 ) 7.74 [ 3.87 ]
VT 3 [ 1.50 ] 1.24 5.89 ( 5.27 + 0.62 ) 5.89 [ 2.94 ]
VA 13 [ 6.50 ] 13.60 12.06 ( 5.27 + 6.79 ) 12.06 [ 6.03 ]
WA 12 [ 6.00 ] 12.37 11.44 ( 5.27 + 6.17 ) 11.44 [ 5.72 ]
WV 5 [ 2.50 ] 3.71 7.13 ( 5.27 + 1.86 ) 7.13 [ 3.56 ]
WI 10 [ 5.00 ] 9.89 10.21 ( 5.27 + 4.94 ) 10.21 [ 5.10 ]
WY 3 [ 1.50 ] 1.24 5.89 ( 5.27 + 0.62 ) 5.89 [ 2.94 ]





DC 3 [ 1.50 ] 1.24 5.89 ( 5.27 + 0.62 ) 5.89 [ 2.94 ]




*Effective electors are tiered approximations based on the number of seats in the U.S. House per state. The real world National Popular Vote effective electors can vary due to relative voter turnout state to state. Note that the National Popular Vote takes effect as soon as enough states enter the pact and can assign a 270 electoral vote majority to the "candidate who receives the most popular votes" where those states each grant all of their electors to that candidate.



CONSTANTS & FORMULAE USED



U.S. Senators Per State = 2

U.S. Senators = 100

U.S. House Representatives = 435

Appended Electoral College Electors for D.C. by Amendment XXIII = 3

Total Electoral College Electors = 100 + 435 + 3 = 538

Current Electors Per State =
(State's # US House Rep.s) + (State's # US Senators)

Proposed Nominal State Legislative, Popular Elector Halves = (Current All-Or-Nothing Electors) ÷ 2

Approx. Effective Electors for a State in the National Popular Vote:
(State's # US House Rep.s / 435) X 538






Bicam II Derivations:



Overall Number of State Legislative Electors, Overall Number of Popular Electors = 538/2 = 269

Overall Number of State Legislative Shares = 51 (50 States and D.C.)

Each State's Legislative Electors = 269/51 or 5.27

Overall Number of Unit Popular Shares = 436 (435 Rep.s + one for D.C.)

A State's Popular Electors = (State's # US House Rep.s / 436) X 269

A State's Allotted Electors = A State's Popular Electors + State's Legislative Electors =
(State's # US House Rep.s / 436) X 269 + (269/51 or 5.27)





Bicam III Derivations:



A State's Allotted Electors = the Bicam II State's Allotted Electors =
(State's # US House Rep.s / 436) X 269 + (269/51 or 5.27)

However...


A State's Legislative Electors, A State's Popular Electors =
(the Bicam II or Bicam III State's Allotted Electors ) ÷ 2





Note that electors are rounded to two decimal points in the table for mere simplicity. They will be carried out to significant digits in execution.






Re-Scroll





Comparison Table Analysis

As you can see, the proposed National Popular Vote (NPV) method is backward since it gives additional effective electors to states who already have sizeable advantages while it takes away such electors from small states who have little voice in the electoral college. Bicameral Electoral College II & III do the opposite. They end up giving more electors to small states by allocating "first" an equal number of base electors to all states, namely 5.27 as opposed to just two electors in the current system and zero in the NPV. We derive 5.27 by splitting the whole body of electors into two halves and giving each state (& D.C.) an equal share of electors in one half analogous as to how our bicameral Congress gives each state an equal number of senators.

Our current electoral allocation is somewhere between the NPV and Bicam II, III distributions while awarding results for most states totally to only one candidate. Our first proposal, Bicam I, allots electors the same as the current distribution but reserves the halves of each state's electors for the state legislature and the state's popular (and/or district popular) vote. It then mutually settles, rounds or otherwise gets whole electors out of the mixed-share electors by whim of the legislature. Bicameral Electoral College I can be used in lieu of or until all states implement the more intricate Bicameral Electoral College II and III versions. We have also suggested that Bicam I split a state's electors only between both houses of its state legislature until the Senate returns to having Senators appointed by state legislators.

Remember in Bicam II & III that fractional allocations and partial electoral vote results are combined, swapped and sorted amongst the states in order to reach the highest number of whole electoral votes for all candidates. The remaining mixed-share electors are then divvied into whole-numbered elector subsets mutually constructed by cooperative campaigns and awarded to certain candidates in the subset. One option they may use to award those electors is a process we refer to as 'ranging' which is applied by default to any leftover set of mixed-share electors not taken for mutual subsets.






Comparison Table redux










Top Index Bottom










*** anchor for 'general election range vote' link ****

GENERAL ELECTION RANGE VOTE & BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE



We can as well perform a range vote for a general presidential election and translate the proper values into the electoral college under any of the three versions of the Bicameral Electoral College (BEC). While we carry out the tie contingencies to length to illustrate completion, they are not likely to go that far.



Statewide Popular Range Vote, No Districts

In the case where a straight range vote is to be carried out for every state's popular component without incorporating any embedded districts-won-by-candidates tally in awarding the overlay of electors -- we correlate a weight to the standardized template of a state's range vote input (its state legislative & popular input). The weight is according to the number of electors the state holds in the electoral college. We use a standardized template since the states' raw inputs would already carry relative weights of state populations and turnout by their sheer ballot volumes and would thus distort the more congressional weighting between the states in the summation. The standardized template for a state is akin to the average elector for a presidential candidate derived in the ranging process described earlier. The template makes it as if every state casts one equal range vote ballot so we instill the close-to-congressional proportions through a weighted summation. Now the weight itself and the intrastate ratio between the state's legislative and popular inputs deriving the template depend on what version of the BEC is used. Once the weighted templates are summated for all states and D.C., we can derive the result of the national overall template range vote (NOTRV). The top two contenders of the NOTRV will have their summary ratings ratioed and then overlayed over the 538 elector slots. Now should there be any ties between candidates vying to be the second of the top two contenders of the NOTRV or a tie amongst three or more for having its highest summary rating, then such ties shall be settled by rank possession of popular range vote inputs. Should that still leave such contested ties then we call upon the House quorum of Amendment XII to be applied (via a resolution if necessary) on at most three candidates. Should there be more than three tied candidates then the House by the usual body whittles them down to three beforehand.

Now having arrived with only two top candidates holding elector shares, we have at most one mixed-share elector (N=2, N-1 = 1). The elector can be mutually settled, rounded or perhaps ranged. If after running those prioritized options it's still tied without agreement then it's given to the candidate with the higher rating (overlay) from the NOTRV and if that too is a tie it goes to the one who has a greater rank possession of popular range vote inputs. If that does not settle it then we subject that one mixed-share elector to the House quorum from Amendment XII in analogous fashion (via a resolution if necessary). From there the electoral college meets with the usual protocols going forward. However, if there is a very unlikely super-duper tie still holding over the mixed-share elector after exhausting all breaking options then the candidates will draw lots.



Statewide Popular Range Vote With Districts

If all the states in order to obtain the best of both worlds decide that their popular range vote components are to incorporate an embedded districts-won-by-candidates tally in the awarding of the overlay of electors onto namely half of the popular side's electors (somewhat a vestigial from before a general range vote) -- we allocate and then assign one quarter or quadrant of the electoral college under the states' districts-won-by-candidates shares. Keep in mind that the interstate ratios of each state's complete set of districts-won-by-candidates shares depends as well upon the version of BEC used. Once the national overall template range vote (NOTRV), top two contenders, ties for same are determined (as done in previous section), the ratio of the top two contenders is overlayed on only the greater 3/4 or three quadrants of the total electoral college electors. Now with all the electors of the electoral college overlayed, we can eventually derive all whole electors for all candidates by referring to 'Converting to All Whole Electors' in the Bicam II section.



Finishing It Off -- But Wait! -- Gotta Keep Everything Half Legislative, Half Popular

Once all of the total electors are assigned to candidates as whole electors, the electoral college meets and proceeds as usual. Note that assigned electors in the districts-won-by-candidates quadrant can act to accentuate the larger 3/4 electors or three quadrants towards a final result. Be aware that candidates other than the top two, national overall template range vote (NOTRV) contenders can have electors in the districts-won-by-candidates quadrant.

In keeping the end results consistent and correct, remember that when the NOTRV gave the top-two assignment of the greater three quadrants, its input had proper amounts of state legislative and popular votes along the way by version of BEC used in order to land a national result based half-and-half state legislative and popular in the greater picture. Yet the districts-won-by-candidates quadrant is only using popular range vote inputs while allowing for no state legislative influence there and thus distorting the original intent of the BECs to have that whole, big-picture result derived from half state legislative and half popular vote. So, for the districts-won-by-candidates quadrant, we really should have split its electors in half with the other half somehow representing a districts-level result on behalf of the state legislatures. How is that to be done? Well, each occupant of the state legislature pretty much represents some sort of district in their state. So we will now overlay half that quadrant or 1/8 of the total electoral college electors with every legislator's relative office share within the collective legislatures and have that share's overlayed electors assigned to a presidential candidate who is that legislator's favorite presidential candidate as indicated on the legislator's range vote ballot (or survey).



Statewide Popular Range Votes Mixed -- When Some States Do, Others Do Not Incorporate Districts-Won-By-Candidates

Now what if not all states incorporate the districts-won-by-candidates method in their popular range vote component? So it will be a mix of some states having such an overlay of districts-won-by-candidates and others not. Going back near the beginning of the earlier example: 'Statewide Popular Range Vote With Districts', the original single quadrant's electors will diminish in number corresponding to the states pulling out. That number of electors is appended to the original 3/4 or three quadrants' electors. We proceed as before getting through the national overall template range vote (NOTRV), top two contenders, ties for same and overlaying the ratio of the top two contenders onto the electors outside the now diminished single quadrant's electors. The electors of that now diminished quadrant will halve themselves in order to accommodate the necessary districts-level result on behalf of the still participating state legislatures. The open half is overlayed with each legislator's relative office share within the collective legislatures of the states still involved in the diminished quadrant. Electors under those shares get assigned their legislator's favorite presidential candidate as indicated on the legislator's range vote ballot (or survey). Now having overlayed all electoral college electors, we again refer to 'Converting to All Whole Electors' in the Bicam II section above.




Re-Scroll










Top Index Bottom













*** anchor for 'considerations' link ****

CONSIDERATIONS



When translating the national overall template range vote (NOTRV) into the electoral college, we cannot overlay more than the chosen two leading candidate's ratings as more than two dilutes the intended elector majority for the NOTRV's winner or moves the contest away from two closely leading candidates of the same.

If incorporating an embedded districts tally from a state's popular range vote for overlay into the electoral college, each district can only be awarded wholly to one victor candidate -- that is no overlay of the district's range vote ratings or their ratios are put over its electors. Instead, district electors are assigned to one highest rated candidate in the district's (part of the state) popular range vote.

If any ballot issues or the like appear, we let the local authorities and courts have their time in addressing them. If by a certain deadline or if they have not properly dealt with the issue then the state legislature will decide the fate of contested ballots. They do so by procedures they have already put in place and/or assembling as a body, perhaps using a round of votes where how the legislature leans about the candidates closes the gaps arising out of the ballots in question.

Having a national popular vote component, any threat of national recount madness after the election can be neutralized by legislatures also having option to replace the statewide popular tallies with the district-by-district popular tallies in order to settle the culminating tie. This also limits election controversies to within relatively fewer districts which nixes the incentive for national recount madness.

Some states can have a plurality vote and others a general range vote using the BECs. The differing state groups assign their electors as separate blocs in the electoral college and a winner relies on coalescing about major candidates or cooperative fronts.












Top Index Bottom













*** anchor for 'simulations' link ****

SIMULATIONS USING THE 2020 ELECTION



We have no direct data on how all state legislators around the country voted for president. Not having that for our BEC plans, we take an easy route and use just the popular vote data state by state for the Bicam III model to see how the resulting proportions change. The first simulation table does so using only the relative popular proportions of the two candidates: Biden and Trump.

Since the plurality or popular vote version of Bicam III can accept the popular shares of all candidates into the electoral college, the second simulation table does that and then tallying the results. There an electoral college winner can be more dependent upon all campaigns coalescing within the electoral college which means even minor campaigns can contribute towards getting a winner and thus votes for such candidates do not have to be considered as wasted.








Top Index Bottom







*anchor for first simulation table*





2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

STATE ELECTORS WON

COMPARED WITH

BICAM III SIMULATION
(USING TWO-PARTY, RELATIVE POPULAR PROPORTIONS ONLY)


State

Biden
Relative
Share


Trump
Relative
Share


Nominal
Electors
Biden
Electors
Trump
Electors

Bicam III
Electors
Biden
Relative
Bicam III
Electors
Trump
Relative
Bicam III
Electors
AL 36.97% 63.03% 9 0 9 9.59 3.55 6.04
AK 44.75% 55.25% 3 03 5.89 2.64 3.25
AZ 50.16% 49.84% 11 11 0 10.83 5.43 5.40
AR 35.79% 64.21% 6 0 6 7.74 2.77 4.97
CA 65.00% 35.00% 55 55 0 37.97 24.68 13.29
CO 56.94% 43.06% 9 9 0 9.59 5.46 4.13
CT 60.17% 39.83% 7 7 0 8.36 5.03 3.33
DE 59.63% 40.37% 3 3 0 5.89 3.51 2.38
FL 48.31% 51.69% 29 0 29 21.93 10.59 11.34
GA 50.13% 49.87% 16 16 0 13.91 6.97 6.94
HI 65.03% 34.97% 4 4 0 6.51 4.23 2.28
ID 34.12% 65.88% 4 0 4 6.51 2.22 4.29
IL 59.03% 40.97% 20 20 0 16.38 9.67 6.71
IN 41.80% 58.20% 11 0 11 10.83 4.53 6.30
IA 45.82% 54.18% 6 0 6 7.74 3.55 4.19
KS 42.26% 57.74% 6 0 6 7.74 3.27 4.47
KY 36.80% 63.20% 8 0 8 8.98 3.30 5.68
LA 40.54% 59.46% 8 0 8 8.98 3.64 5.34
ME 54.49% 45.51% 4 3 1 6.51 3.55 2.96
MD 67.00% 33.00% 10 10 0 10.21 6.84 3.37
MA 66.85% 33.15% 11 11 0 10.83 7.24 3.59
MI 51.42% 48.58% 16 16 0 13.91 7.15 6.76
MN 53.63% 46.37% 10 10 0 10.21 5.48 4.73
MS 41.62% 58.38% 6 0 6 7.74 3.22 4.52
MO 42.06% 57.94% 10 0 10 10.21 4.29 5.92
MT 41.60% 58.40% 3 0 3 5.89 2.45 3.44
NE 40.24% 59.76% 5 1 4 7.13 2.87 4.26
NV 51.22% 48.78% 6 6 0 7.74 3.96 3.78
NH 53.75% 46.25% 4 4 0 6.51 3.50 3.01
NJ 58.07% 41.93% 14 14 0 12.68 7.36 5.32
NM 55.52% 44.48% 5 5 0 7.13 3.96 3.17
NY 57.50% 42.50% 29 29 0 21.93 12.61 9.32
NC 49.31% 50.69% 15 0 15 13.30 6.56 6.74
ND 32.79% 67.21% 3 0 3 5.89 1.93 3.96
OH 45.94% 54.06% 18 0 18 15.15 6.96 8.19
OK 33.06% 66.94% 7 0 7 8.36 2.76 5.60
OR 58.31% 41.69% 7 7 0 8.36 4.87 3.49
PA 50.59% 49.41% 20 20 0 16.38 8.29 8.09
RI 60.51% 39.49% 4 4 0 6.51 3.94 2.57
SC 44.07% 55.93% 9 0 9 9.59 4.23 5.36
SD 36.57% 63.43% 3 0 3 5.89 2.15 3.74
TN 38.12% 61.88% 11 0 11 10.83 4.13 6.70
TX 47.17% 52.83% 38 0 38 27.49 12.97 14.52
UT 39.31% 60.69% 6 0 6 7.74 3.04 4.70
VT 68.30% 31.70% 3 3 0 5.89 4.02 1.87
VA 55.15% 44.85% 13 13 0 12.06 6.65 5.41
WA 59.94% 40.06% 12 12 0 11.44 6.86 4.58
WV 30.20% 69.80% 5 0 5 7.13 2.15 4.98
WI 50.32% 49.68% 10 10 0 10.21 5.14 5.07
WY 27.52% 72.48% 3 0 3 5.89 1.62 4.27




DC 94.46% 5.54% 3 3 0 5.89 5.56 0.33



TOTAL:&



306
Biden

232
Trump


TOTAL:&



273.35
Biden

264.65
Trump




CONSTANTS & FORMULAE USED


Candidate Relative Share =
Candidate Vote Share / (Biden Vote Share + Trump Vote Share) {a.k.a. the 'Denominator'}


The values of the (Biden Vote Share + Trump Vote Share) were posted, calculated and presented as the 'Denominator' in an earlier table.

Nominal Electors = Current Electors Per State =
(State's # US House Rep.s) + (State's # US Senators)

Candidate Electors are usually whole elector slates awarded to a candidate in an all-or-nothing contest according to a statewide popular vote in most states excluding Nebraska and Maine who award electors by victor of a congressional district.





Bicam III Derivations:



A State's Bicam III Electors = the Bicam II State's Allotted Electors =
(State's # US House Rep.s / 436) X 269 + (269/51 or 5.27)
{For more specifics see: 'Bicam II Derivations' repeated below.}

Candidate's Relative Bicam III Electors = (State's Bicam III Electors) X (Candidate's Relative Share)







For Bicam II Derivations:



U.S. Senators Per State = 2

U.S. Senators = 100

U.S. House Representatives = 435

Appended Electoral College Electors for D.C. by Amendment XXIII = 3

Total Electoral College Electors = 100 + 435 + 3 = 538





Bicam II Derivations:



Overall Number of State Legislative Electors, Overall Number of Popular Electors = 538/2 = 269

Overall Number of State Legislative Shares = 51 (50 States and D.C.)

Each State's Legislative Electors = 269/51 or 5.27

Overall Number of Unit Popular Shares = 436 (435 Rep.s + one for D.C.)

A State's Popular Electors = (State's # US House Rep.s / 436) X 269

A State's Allotted Electors = A State's Popular Electors + State's Legislative Electors =
(State's # US House Rep.s / 436) X 269 + (269/51 or 5.27)





Note that Candidate Relative Share percentages and the resulting Candidate Relative Bicam III Electors are rounded to two decimal points due to derivation from Candidate Vote Shares that were given to two decimal places in the source table. Bicam III Electors are similarly rounded.






Re-Scroll




Simulations 2020 redux







Top Index Bottom










*anchor for second simulation table*









2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

BICAM III SIMULATION
(USING MULTI-PARTY, ACTUAL POPULAR PROPORTIONS ONLY)


State
Bicam III Electors
Biden
Vote
Share
(Electors)
Trump
Vote
Share
(Electors)
Libertarian
Vote
Share
(Electors)
Green
Vote
Share
(Electors)
Other
Vote
Share
(Electors)
AL 9.59 36.57% • • ( 3.51 ) 62.03% • •( 5.94 ) 1.08% • •( 0.10 ) - - 0.31% • • ( 0.03 )
AK 5.89 42.77% • • ( 2.52 ) 52.83% • • ( 3.11 ) 2.47% • • ( 0.15 ) 0.74% • •( 0.04 ) 1.18% • • ( 0.07 )
AZ 10.83 49.22% • • ( 5.33 ) 48.91% • • ( 5.30 ) 1.51% • • ( 0.16 ) - - 0.36% • • ( 0.04 )
AR 7.74 34.78% • • ( 2.69 ) 62.40% • • ( 4.83 ) 1.08% • • ( 0.08 ) - - 1.76% • • ( 0.14 )
CA 37.97 63.44% • • ( 24.09 ) 34.30% • • ( 13.02 ) 1.07% • • ( 0.41 ) 0.46% • • ( 0.17 ) 0.72% • • ( 0.27 )
CO 9.59 55.40% • • ( 5.31 ) 41.90% • • ( 4.02 ) 1.61% • • ( 0.15 ) 0.28% • • ( 0.03 ) 0.82% • • ( 0.08 )
CT 8.36 59.24% • • ( 4.95 ) 39.21% • • ( 3.28 ) 1.11% • • ( 0.09 ) 0.41% • • ( 0.03 ) 0.03% • • ( 0.00 )
DE 5.89 58.74% • • ( 3.46 ) 39.77% • • ( 2.34 ) 0.99% • • ( 0.06 ) 0.42% • • ( 0.02 ) 0.07% • • ( 0.00 )
FL 21.93 47.76% • • ( 10.47 ) 51.11% • • ( 11.21 ) 0.63% • • ( 0.14 ) - - 0.50% • • ( 0.11 )
GA 13.91 49.47% • • ( 6.88 ) 49.24% • • ( 6.85 ) 1.24% • • ( 0.17 ) - - 0.04% • • ( 0.01 )
HI 6.51 63.73% • • ( 4.15 ) 34.27% • • ( 2.23 ) 0.96% • • ( 0.06 ) 0.67% • • ( 0.04 ) 0.37% • • ( 0.02 )
ID 6.51 32.98% • • ( 2.15 ) 63.67% • • ( 4.14 ) 1.88% • • ( 0.12 ) - - 1.47% • • ( 0.10 )
IL 16.38 57.39% • • ( 9.40 ) 40.45% • • ( 6.63 ) 1.10% • • ( 0.18 ) 0.50% • • ( 0.08 ) 0.55% • • ( 0.09 )
IN 10.83 40.88% • • ( 4.43 ) 56.91% • • ( 6.16 ) 1.94% • • ( 0.21 ) - - 0.27% • • ( 0.03 )
IA 7.74 44.89% • • ( 3.47 ) 53.09% • • ( 4.11 ) 1.16% • • ( 0.09 ) - - 0.86% • • ( 0.07 )
KS 7.74 41.40% • • ( 3.20 ) 56.00% • • ( 4.33 ) 2.22% • • ( 0.17 ) - - 0.38% • • ( 0.03 )
KY 8.98 36.13% • • ( 3.24 ) 62.05% • • ( 5.57 ) 1.23% • • ( 0.11 ) - - 0.59% • • ( 0.05 )
LA 8.98 39.85% • • ( 3.58 ) 58.46% • • ( 5.25 ) 1.01% • • ( 0.09 ) - - 0.68% • • ( 0.06 )
ME 6.51 53.09% • • ( 3.46 ) 44.03% • • ( 2.87 ) 1.72% • • ( 0.11 ) 1.00% • • ( 0.07 ) 0.15% • • ( 0.01 )
MD 10.21 65.36% • • ( 6.67 ) 32.15% • • ( 3.28 ) 1.10% • • ( 0.11 ) 0.52% • • ( 0.05 ) 0.87% • • ( 0.09 )
MA 10.83 65.60% • • ( 7.10 ) 32.14% • • ( 3.48 ) 1.29% • • ( 0.14 ) 0.51% • • ( 0.06 ) 0.45% • • ( 0.05 )
MI 13.91 50.55% • • ( 7.03 ) 47.77% • • ( 6.64 ) 1.09% • • ( 0.15 ) - - 0.59% • • ( 0.08 )
MN 10.21 52.40% • • ( 5.35 ) 45.28% • • ( 4.62 ) 1.07% • • ( 0.11 ) 0.31% • • ( 0.03 ) 0.95% • • ( 0.10 )
MS 7.74 41.04% • • ( 3.18 ) 57.57% • • ( 4.46 ) 0.61% • •( 0.05 ) - - 0.78% • • ( 0.06 )
MO 10.21 41.34% • • ( 4.22 ) 56.71% • • ( 5.79 ) 1.36% • • ( 0.14 ) 0.27% • •( 0.03 ) 0.31% • • ( 0.03 )
MT 5.89 40.55% • • ( 2.39 ) 56.92% • • ( 3.35 ) 2.53% • • ( 0.15 ) - - 0.01% • • ( 0.00 )
NE 7.13 39.17% • • ( 2.80 ) 58.22% • • ( 4.15 ) 2.12% • • ( 0.15 ) - - 0.49% • • ( 0.03 )
NV 7.74 50.06% • • ( 3.87 ) 47.67% • • ( 3.70 ) 1.05% • • ( 0.08 ) - - 1.22% • • ( 0.09 )
NH 6.51 52.71% • • ( 3.43 ) 45.36% • • ( 2.95 ) 1.64% • • ( 0.11 ) - - 0.30% • • ( 0.02 )
NJ 12.68 57.14% • • ( 7.25 ) 41.25% • • ( 5.23 ) 0.69% • • ( 0.09 ) 0.31% • • ( 0.04 ) 0.60% • • ( 0.08 )
NM 7.13 54.29% • • ( 3.87 ) 43.50% • • ( 3.10 ) 1.36% • • ( 0.10 ) 0.48% • •( 0.03 ) 0.37% • • ( 0.03 )
NY 21.93 60.76% • • ( 13.32 ) 37.67% • • ( 8.26 ) 0.70% • • ( 0.15 ) 0.38% • •( 0.08 ) 0.49% • • ( 0.11 )
NC 13.30 48.59% • • ( 6.46 ) 49.93% • • ( 6.64 ) 0.88% • •( 0.12 ) - - 0.60% • • ( 0.08 )
ND 5.89 31.76% • • ( 1.87 ) 65.11% • • ( 3.83 ) 2.60% • •( 0.15 ) - - 0.53% • • ( 0.03 )
OH 15.15 45.16% • • ( 6.84 ) 53.18% • • ( 8.06 ) 1.14% • •( 0.17 ) 0.32% • • ( 0.05 ) 0.20% • • ( 0.03 )
OK 8.36 32.29% • • ( 2.70 ) 65.37% • • ( 5.46 ) 1.58% • •( 0.13 ) - - 0.76% • • ( 0.06 )
OR 8.36 56.45% • • ( 4.72 ) 40.37% • • ( 3.37 ) 1.75% • •( 0.15 ) 0.50% • • ( 0.04 ) 0.93% • • ( 0.08 )
PA 16.38 49.87% • • ( 8.17 ) 48.69% • • ( 7.98 ) 1.14% • •( 0.19 ) - - 0.30% • •( 0.05 )
RI 6.51 59.39% • • ( 3.87 ) 38.61% • • ( 2.51 ) 0.98% • •( 0.06 ) - - 1.02% • • ( 0.07 )
SC 9.59 43.43% • • ( 4.16 ) 55.11% • • ( 5.29 ) 1.11% • •( 0.11 ) 0.27% • • ( 0.03 ) 0.07% • • ( 0.01 )
SD 5.89 35.61% • • ( 2.10 ) 61.77% • • ( 3.64 ) 2.63% • •( 0.15 ) - - - -
TN 10.83 37.45% • • ( 4.06 ) 60.66% • • ( 6.57 ) 0.98% • •( 0.11 ) - - 0.91% • • ( 0.10 )
TX 27.49 46.44% • • ( 12.77 ) 52.01% • • ( 14.30 ) 1.11% • •( 0.30 ) 0.29% • • ( 0.08 ) 0.14% • • ( 0.04 )
UT 7.74 37.21% • • ( 2.88 ) 57.45% • • ( 4.45 ) 2.55% • •( 0.20 ) 0.34% • • ( 0.03 ) 2.46% • • ( 0.19 )
VT 5.89 66.09% • • ( 3.89 ) 30.67% • •( 1.81 ) 0.98% • •( 0.06 ) 0.36% • • ( 0.02 ) 1.91% • • ( 0.11 )
VA 12.06 54.11% • • ( 6.53 ) 44.00% • • ( 5.31 ) 1.45% • •( 0.17 ) - - 0.44% • • ( 0.05 )
WA 11.44 57.97% • • ( 6.63 ) 38.77% • • ( 4.44 ) 1.97% • •( 0.23 ) 0.45% • • ( 0.05 ) 0.85% • • ( 0.10 )
WV 7.13 29.69% • • ( 2.12 ) 68.62% • • ( 4.89 ) 1.34% • •( 0.10 ) - - 0.34% • • ( 0.02 )
WI 10.21 49.45% • • ( 5.05 ) 48.82% • • ( 4.98 ) 1.17% • •( 0.12 ) - - 0.56% • • ( 0.06 )
WY 5.89 26.55% • • ( 1.56 ) 69.94% • • ( 4.12 ) 2.08% • •( 0.12 ) - - 1.43% • • ( 0.08 )


• • • •



DC 5.89 92.15% • • ( 5.43 ) 5.40% • • ( 0.32 ) 0.59% • •( 0.03 ) 0.50% • • ( 0.03 ) 1.36% • • ( 0.08 )
TOTAL:&
268.58
Biden


258.17
Trump


6.85
Libertarian


1.13
Green


3.11
Other






CONSTANTS & FORMULAE USED


Bicam III Derivations:



A State's Bicam III Electors = the Bicam II State's Allotted Electors =
(State's # US House Rep.s / 436) X 269 + (269/51 or 5.27)
{For more specifics see: 'Bicam II Derivations' repeated below.}




Candidate or Party Vote Shares are listed on a state's page accessed by clicking that state in the map at the top of the source page.

Candidate's or Party's Electors = (State's Bicam III Electors) X (Candidate's or Party's Vote Share)





For Bicam II Derivations:



U.S. Senators Per State = 2

U.S. Senators = 100

U.S. House Representatives = 435

Appended Electoral College Electors for D.C. by Amendment XXIII = 3

Total Electoral College Electors = 100 + 435 + 3 = 538





Bicam II Derivations:



Overall Number of State Legislative Electors, Overall Number of Popular Electors = 538/2 = 269

Overall Number of State Legislative Shares = 51 (50 States and D.C.)

Each State's Legislative Electors = 269/51 or 5.27

Overall Number of Unit Popular Shares = 436 (435 Rep.s + one for D.C.)

A State's Popular Electors = (State's # US House Rep.s / 436) X 269

A State's Allotted Electors = A State's Popular Electors + State's Legislative Electors =
(State's # US House Rep.s / 436) X 269 + (269/51 or 5.27)








Re-Scroll




Simulations 2020 redux







Top Index Bottom













*** anchor for 'links' ****

LINKS




Here are a few sites that have more information about the electoral college, presidential elections, election systems in general and some advocacy sites for change to our election process.





Constitution Party - Electoral College Plank: Short of getting a bicameral electoral college, the congressional district approach with two statewide at-large electors is a good fall-back plan and would be a step in the right direction away from the current system.


Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections has various election maps for primaries and caucuses of the country broken down state by state and in various graph forms as well. Analysis and predictions for current races are also featured.


Federal Register - Electoral College Home Page ~ Office of the Federal Register's web page on the Electoral College.


Coalition For Free and Open Elections advances the cause of fair ballot access for independents and third parties where the current system heavily rigs races towards Republican and Democrat dominance.


Black Box Voting 2.0 'The core problem for our fragile elections framework is secrecy: withholding from the public the evidence needed to authenticate whether results are true. Incentives to control election outcomes are powerful.'


Thirty-Thousand.org proposes ditching the limitation enacted in 1913 (a nefarious year of federal legislation) that limited our House Representatives to 435 total. The U.S. now has the second largest enumerated districts in the world by their populations.


Score Voting (sometimes called range voting) is a single-winner voting system where voters rate candidates on a scale.






















Adams quote about two-party system



*** anchor for Bottom ****


Top Index Links





Commonwealth Party of America
Bicameral Electoral College page last revised: May 2021
Office of National Premiere
Commonwealth Party of America


** Bottom Banner In A Graphic Browser**