PROCESS TO ALLOCATE SCRAP MIXED-SHARE ELECTORS

Linked from the BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE II text

http://www.commonwealthparty.net/electoralcollege.htm#hotpotato











Revised: 7/22/14



*Section (E) corrected which had erroneously focused only on leading trend-tied candidates. Added paragraph to (B) which emphasizes this and other attributes of dispersion.


* Five new sections added. Theory appears to now be fully fleshed-out:


~ Range vote survey automated and simplified.


~Undeterminations filtered out and standardized through combination of a core premise and automated range survey.


~ Supreme Court straight-ranking vote fully explained.


* Except for graphics and polishing, should be near to a working manual for the process. Hypertext Outline provides links to new sections.





(previous) What to do when the suggested popular vote for choosing between elector distribution methods is undeterminable or too close to call.












Hypertext Outline






General Summary In Handling Of Scrap Mixed-Share Electors
Survey Of Candidates By Range Vote
Formal Introduction Of Subsets



Consideration Of A Subset's Elector Slot Allocations:

(A) Total Subset Allocation To A Non-Tied Lead Candidate
(B) Dispersion For Leading Range Ties By Trending
(C) Total Subset Allocation For Leading Range Ties By Trending
(D) Calling Outside Bodies To Settle Leading Trend-Tied Candidates (Total Subset Allocation)
(E) Calling Outside Bodies To Settle Trend-Tied Candidates (Dispersion)



Undeterminations and Precedences:

(F) Causes Of Undetermination
(G) Core Premise On Handling Undeterminations
(H) Automation Of Range Vote Survey And Standardization Of Undeterminations
(I) Correlation Precedence And The Supreme Court Straight-Ranking Vote




Unforeseen Circumstances
Overkill To Hammer Out Theory & Process
Computer Simulation











General Summary In Handling Of Scrap Mixed-Share Electors


Range vote surveys which rate all the presidential candidates are completed by all the candidates themselves or by their potential electors, the Congress and the Supreme Court before election day. After the final election results the state values attained are combined, swapped and sorted to obtain a tally of each candidate's whole electors won plus any partial share of any remaining scrap mixed-share electors. Candidates are then allowed the opportunity to participate in an exchange where they are able to combine or splice their partial share of the scrap mixed-share electors freely with other candidates holding same in order to derive certain mutually constructed subsets of whole yet mixed-share electors. To culminate the relative decisive powers of the localized candidates of a subset, the pertinent inputs from the range vote survey by and upon the candidates (or by their potential electors onto the candidates) who share in the same mutually constructed subset are correlated and applied in same proportion to the combination of spliced and/or partial shares of the candidate camps within. This grants a local victor who rates best within the subset at hand.

Award of the subset to a local victor follows the usual range vote protocol for politics. So the one who accumulates the highest rating by the intra-subset applied range vote survey wins. Such a victor may award the subset's immediate whole elector slots at whim, perhaps in a manner agreed to with the other partial/spliced shareholders participating in the same mutual subset. Actually, any candidate camp awarded whole elector slots whether as victors, donees or even by some procedural default can fill those slots in any valid manner they see fit. Besides any call for transparency, it may be best to make the results of the candidates' range vote surveys or of the campaigns' potential elector range vote surveys (whichever used) known to the other camps in order to best construct & hammer out the agreements over the building of subsets which will be done in anticipation of certain local victors, types thereof or particular slot allocations.

Now if there happens to be a tie (or perhaps some results near enough within statistical error) including two or more leading subset candidates resulting by internal application of that range vote survey then -- assuming any state of surprise -- the candidates involved in the tie are allowed the opportunity to mutually consider & administer any new agreement over awarding the constructed subset's whole elector slots in question to particular candidate camps and may then do so directly before having to resort instead to any necessary alternate methods of determination applicable to the mutually claimed elector slots in disagreement. The other parties or any other possible elector slots may be involved in similar negotiations should the grant of any elector slots in general be regarded as objectionable to the initial agreements supporting construction of that subset.

Concerning those leading range ties via a subset - whether there is award of any elector slots by default, what remaining elector slots are left to award & possibly when there is lack of agreement then what further alternate methods come into play all depend on whether the subset's associated elector slots are to be granted all at once in total to an eventual victor or dispersed about for leading range-tied cases. Total subset allocation eventually awards the constructed mixed-share elector subset at hand to just one of the leading range-tied candidates barring mutual agreement or officially & initially before any possible donations. The other way is some form of dispersion where a mixed-share elector subset containing leading range ties is geared to be divvied by whole elector slots amongst all and/or some of its leading range-tied candidates. In dispersion, the first dispersal is an equal base distribution amongst a subset's leading range-tied candidates when possible. A further criteria is employed to determine grant of elector slots fewer in number to the count of leading range-tied candidates. Of course, these dispersions can be altered by mutual agreement amongst relevant parties.

One would think that if a candidate camp with partial/spliced share in any certain constructed mixed-share elector(s) or subset figures they can get a better deal elsewhere or if the other shareholders of any initial construct renege on some agreement, then that candidate camp will pull out to help form another assuming there is enough time along with an open subset opportunity before some looming deadline of casting the electors in flesh and blood. Any such deadlines would be dependent upon the state legislatures and the Congress via Article II of the U.S. Constitution. There can be a remaining leftover and disparate construction that the camps cannot further utilize the partial and splice shares within. It will be justly determined as any other subset.

Before we get to describing any protocols and in order to make convenient the principles of the order of precedence to be used, we repost the following text that preceded the link to this process which appeared on the original Bicameral Electoral College Reform page:



' ...Then a process comes into play that determines the allocation of those final scrap mixed-share electors. It first utilizes a function reliant upon the inherent proportions of representation according to the partial shares of the candidates within mutually constructed subsets of the mixed-share electors. Should there be leading ties within a subset, it falls back on trends by the those tied candidates exhibited in the overall electorate. Both those steps should take precedence before having to resort to any outside bodies like the Congress, Supreme Court or random allocations -- all of which can be invoked successively in case of further ties or perhaps other undeterminable circumstances. The process should weed-out approaches that can yield arbitrary results or inconsistencies. It should carry out as best as possible political representation and competition within those scrap mixed-share electors via derived subsets towards localized victors using procedural rationale and ethical considerations -- all of which will determine the mathematical model of its structure. We use this list of steps and considerations as a reference in order to devise the various protocols and alternates reflecting such priorities.

Note: For the number of candidates with electoral college elector shares, say N, the maximum number of scrap mixed-share electors is N-1 '



These stated principles will guide the cycle of awarding whole elector slots from the scrap mixed-share elector subsets. It starts out with the pertinent and proportioned range vote survey input concerning the occupants of a subset as aforementioned in the very first paragraph. Assuming then a resulting sole lead candidate, such a local victor is permitted to donate elector slots about the other presidential (or vice-presidential) campaigns in the subset as enticement perhaps to have built such a certain, mutual whole-elector collection. There may be reconsideration of any prior construct agreements that were made in anticipation of one clear victor should any subset change or unexpected result bring forth instead leading range-tied candidates who are able, if in agreement, to directly determine the associated subset's elector slots in question on account of their exclusive lead status. If the dispersion method is being used, they may happen to also agree upon some determination of elector slots not in question which would be the ones they got in any possible equal base distribution. Will the other camps in the subset agree to any or all of these results? If not, they have option to bolt.

Now whenever there is no mutual agreement over administering elector slots in question by leading range-tied candidates then an alternate method of determination comes into play which is the rank of those leading range-tied candidate camps in the overall electoral results. Now should ties have happened there affecting outcome of any elector slots in question then from such specific, remaining tied candidates they can again consider agreement. If there is no mutual agreement there, then determination depends on the appropriate congressional body's range vote survey rankings pertaining to those specific, remaining tied candidates. If ties without agreement happen there then resort to the range vote survey by the Supreme Court to eliminate any specific remaining ties in question. Ties without agreement there will option for the Supreme Court to carry out a straight-ranking vote. If that is unsuccessful by tireing of more embedded ties to the hilt lacking agreement or the Court waives it completely, we then finally just go by lots.

As is stated later in this treatise, the protocols described for the more extreme cases with ties on top of ties and other rare occurrences fall under overkill since ties in range votes are not likely which limits the chance of further ties down the line by the same scope. Nonetheless, such descriptions are herein carried out on behalf of the case of very close elections accompanied by such concerns. Besides, such indepth discourse better illustrates and tests the rigors of this system and ensures you determination of the electoral college.




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Survey Of Candidates By Range Vote


Our process to determine award of those scrap mixed-share electors as a function of the electorate's election results makes use of the range or score vote. A survey using that method previously taken by the presidential candidates will be utilized in which each candidate was to rate all the candidates. The survey is taken previous to election day in order to focus more on candidate quality considerations as opposed to the more immediate strategic impulses resulting from the election's initial electoral college allocations. Sometime after the election - probably as overall lead candidates become more obvious and subsets become more settled - the range vote survey input by candidates holding partial/spliced share in a particular constructed subset of whole yet mixed-share elector(s) and only the parts of their input which are applicable upon candidates likewise involved will be used towards awarding that subset's elector slots. By each candidate's relative mixed-share of that subset, their relevant input will be proportioned and executed together as a distinct, localized range vote. The results of this truncated and adjusted application of the original range (or score) vote survey will (barring ties) determine the victor candidate who best rated or was found more acceptable amongst the mixed-share candidates involved to be awarded those particular scrap mixed-share elector slots outlining the constructed subset. For reference we may refer to this as "ranging" or "scoring the scrap".

Another way to obtain a survey rating of all the candidates is by getting a thoroughly representative sample of potential electors from each of the presidential candidate camps or instead using all potentials for each camp where in either case they fill out a range vote survey which rates all of the candidates prior to the election. Norms are then derived on behalf of each of the candidate camps. The normed survey input from camps who hold partials (or splices) of the scrap mixed-share electors constituting a subset at hand would be proportioned by their relative share and executed in a truncated application of the range vote survey per that subset just as the presidential candidates' input was in the previous paragraph. There may be some differences between either version, but each should function within similar parameters in determining the final allocation victor for those particular scrap electors within the subset at hand. This is surmised since the potential electors are loyalists to their candidate and to their ideology and they are chosen as such -- thus they likely think similarly about the field of candidates as their favored one does. Yet maybe substitution using the potential elector norms in place of candidate survey input or vice versa can resolve leading range-tied situations by just enough of a margin if such substitution is considered valid. Averaged combination of both inputs may work as well to help conclude ties or may work better for a general application. It depends on preference or view of electors as an endorsement of voice entrusted unto a candidate towards executive direction or more as intermediate representation of the voice of the people for executive direction.

As compared to just a list of names on a range vote survey to have immediate scores pegged to them, a more qualitative range vote survey provides deeper analysis. This would bring forth a more honest or accurate assessment of the candidates by rating them in various aspects such as their economic and political beliefs, their stance on security and the role of government, social and foreign policy and general attributes like honesty, character & temperament. A candidate's performance in the past along with their stances on current issues plus their constitutional adherence should be included as well. All such scores in those categories could be focused together into one overall index value associated with a particular candidate. The campaigns would review and agree over the wording of the survey as to patrol against bias or manipulative word-smithing.




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Formal Introduction Of Subsets


In a previous version of this process, we clumsily ranged all the scrap mixed-share electors at once as a single "district" since to do so otherwise through various groupings as constructed by an exterior interest would yield arbitrary results dependent upon how the involved candidates' partial/spliced shares within various subsets happened to be arranged. However with more thought, the potential differences arising from varying allocations to subsets would not be considered as arbitrary if subsets are constructed by the mutual cooperation amongst the candidates' campaigns who provide the partial or spliced shares. That is the freedom of association of the candidates and of the political capital entrusted to them - their partial and spliced shares - will allow for certain mutually constructed, whole mixed-share elector subsets or "districts" in which the parties involved feel the results will more closely express the intentions or strategies on behalf of the concerns they represent. It would be premature to range all the scrap mixed-share electors at once to one victor without allowing for such feasible distribution on behalf of the political or ideological cliques within.

So we now have the justification for attaining more precise "districts" made up of certain partial/spliced shares that exhibit whole-elector count containment values. We then range these subsets of electors to grant localized victors. Any left-over, unuseable or unmutual scrap mixed-share elector(s) will end up being ranged as a unit to settle that more disparate and unmutual "district", yet the overall allocations of the total scrap mixed-share elector slots through subsets will be more agreeable to more of the candidate camps involved.




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Consideration of A Subset's Elector Slot Allocations:




(A) Total Subset Allocation To A Non-Tied Lead Candidate



With any non-tied lead candidate resulting from a ranged, scrap mixed-share elector subset, we still award all that subset's elector slots to that one highest victor in usual fashion to how range votes are used in elections. This is opposed to awarding the involved elector slots in some rank fashion amongst top competitors as one would think is hinted by Olympic or sports competitions which use the range vote while awarding gold, silver and bronze medals. Remember that we are excluding cases of leading range-tied situations here and before considering any possible subsequent donations from the victor. Notice as well that those three type medals are given just by rank and not according to relative proportions of the scores. And under all conditions whether for the top or all electoral competitors in subsets, it is not possible to universally disperse unitary whole elector slots to precisely match relative performance in the range applications.

So under total subset allocation, we look to these ranged scrap-elector subsets with leading non-tied results as "district" races that are officially and initially won by a sole victor who then has power to determine award of the subset's elector slots. Such sole victor is the one who rates the highest in overall satisfaction via range application through the candidate camps' relative shares and becomes one best representative for that fractionally mixed part of the electorate. Think of it as a certain part of the electoral college's slot grid getting initially uniformed for its most desirable representative candidate. Again, all this is not to say however that the winning camp may not then share or donate whole unitary elector slots to the other candidates within their subset. Such may be desirable for some benefit whether real or symbolic and serve as an incentive for cooperation in constructing particular whole elector subsets. The political cliques involved will coalesce such subsets to achieve same, similar or advantageous overall suffrage in a final electoral vote for president.




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(B) Dispersion For Leading Range Ties By Trending


Now we have some options to consider. When the leading candidates are tied (or near to a tie within statistical margin) by the results of ranging a scrap mixed-share elector subset, do we still award the total set of elector slots to one eventual victor determined by some alternate criteria or do we in such case allow dispersion of the subset's elector slots in question one-by-one across the roster of leading tied candidates by alternate criteria after an equal base distribution? That is do we allocate the total subset at once or disperse elector slots? In the spirit of now awarding through multiple subsets which are carved out from all the scrap mixed-share electors, we consider doing analogous on behalf of leading tied candidates from ranged subsets when those situations arise. As usual, we will allow this as long as it does not incorporate unethical practice or inconsistencies that would render allocations ambivalent or arbitrary throughout procedure and protocol either locally or in their ultimate effect.

In usage it may work like this: When the number of leading range-tied candidates across a subset is equal to the number of its elector slots to allocate, we just give one elector slot to each by default and they can do with them as they wish. If the number of subset elector slots is more than leading range-tied candidates and the candidate camps cannot agree who should receive the extras after an equal base distribution, another method will be needed to assign those extras which happens to also be used and described in the following scenario....For the case when the number of subset elector slots is fewer than leading range-tied candidates where they too reach no mutual agreement on awarding, we give one elector slot at a time starting with the leading range-tied candidate who has the highest total number of overall whole plus partial elector values won via the immediate national election results. For the following or any remaining elector slot to award in the subset, the next leading range-tied candidate who possesses the next highest total number of whole plus partial elector values won via the immediate national election results -- that candidate receives an elector slot. Then same for the next highest and so on going with that descending criteria. So we award an elector slot to successive leading range-tied candidates by their rank of possessed whole+partial elector values won by the immediate national election results until depletion of the subset's unclaimed slots. Remember that the national election results will always be eventually determined by a deadline before the electoral college meets since state legislatures will make final determinations via their outifts which were established in order to complete their state electoral slates in case of any election mishaps that could delay the immediate national election results.

Notice this alternate determination based on the total number of whole+partial elector values held by a particular candidate via the immediate national election results uses the favoring trend of the overall electorate to determine unclaimed elector slot allocations for leading range-tied candidates in a subset which is exhibiting an effective draw of opinion about them. This alternate method follows our earlier stated order of precedence that says the inherent representation via the partial/spliced shares of the subset candidates involved is used first and then if necessary their overall trend in the rest of the electorate comes into play before resorting to outside bodies for determination. For reference, we will call this alternate method of determination something like "trending the leading range ties" or just "trending" for short.

***anchor for link from section (E)***

Should we also reach a tie in the total number of overall possessed whole+partial elector values via the immediate national election results between any remaining leading range-tied candidates eligible to be given elector slots and there are not enough slots to dish out equally between them in single fashion, then starting from amongst such leading range-tied candidates we invoke in succession one of the latter determinations whenever there is lack of agreement among whatever remaining and relevant candidate camps exhibiting ties. Those successive determinations are: the range vote survey rankings by the House (or Senate for VP), Supreme Court's range vote survey rankings with option for a Supreme Court straight-ranking vote and then the drawing of lots whether invoked by the straight-ranking vote or due to same being waived. We use that order of precedence in order to decide who gets the subset's remaining unclaimed elector slots in a dispersive manner or to weed out unmutual ties. This resorting to outside bodies concerning the leading range-tied candidates who are also tied by trending and in contention under dispersion for elector slots relatively fewer in number will be described more in depth in section (E).

***anchor for link from revisions***

We fully recognize here that equal base distributions occur only under the dispersion method. When they are possible due to the total elector slots being equal or more in number than all the initial leading range-tied candidates, that will be the first equal base distribution. Also under dispersion, for all trending & latter determination scenarios without (sufficient) undeterminations -- all such scenarios being embedded within the leading range-tied level -- any remaining elector slots still in contention between whatever remaining and relevant candidates will be fewer in number. However, it is possible to have an equal base distribution further down the road if during invocation of the range-dependent latter methods enough of the remaining and relevant candidate camps involved exhibit undetermination which results in more elector slots left to distribute than determinable candidates. Such a situation will be described more fully in section (G) 'Core Premise On Handling Undeterminations' further ahead. We emphasize that ties of contention beyond the initial leading range-tied level under dispersion can occur between candidates who need not be leading ties per that level. Think of the string of remaining and relevant candidates where some of the earlier elector slots have been taken by those with higher rankings (some perhaps tied but they were exhausted or no previous ties at all) yet the candidates still left over have an equal ranking and are in contention for the remaining fewer elector slots to be granted one-by-one.

Keep in mind that while dispersion and total subset allocation yield different outcomes in the initial award of a subset's elector slots, they are not contradictory or arbitrary methods within themselves. Despite that their initial outcomes are indeed different from each other, we are able to choose one or the other as a standard option since both methods are reflective of valid perceptions on how to award elector slots concerning tied candidates. Mutual agreements among any constructed subset's spliced & partial-share candidates, the leanings of political cliques constructing their subsets plus the emerging sway due to rise of the overall major candidates will significantly lessen the difference toward final outcomes of both methods.

***anchor for choose either ***

Still, if there is concern that in a close race down to the wire that the people will object to the final outcome because dispersion was chosen over total subset allocation or vice versa (the losers will tend to oppose the method chosen) then let the people decide for themselves which method is to be utilized beforehand. Do so by putting it to a choice on the ballot in each presidential election where one method is invoked over the other based on a popular vote outcome. That way the end result will always be the people's own "fault". A simple description of the two methods concerning how each functions to determine a winner in a real close contest would be posted in various media before the election and in precincts on election day.

***anchor for do link in revisions ***

But what if the popular vote to choose between total subset allocation and dispersion is too close to call or undeterminable for some reason? We then rely on both houses of Congress to agree on which method by a vote taken before the election. However, what if the houses differ on the method to be used? In that case we call on the sitting official Speaker of the House and the sitting Vice President to choose lots. If the Speaker wins lots then the method passed by the House is used, otherwise it will be the method passed by the Senate and won by the Vice President.




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(C) Total Subset Allocation For Leading Range Ties By Trending


What if we decided not to allow for the official-initial dispersion amongst leading range-tied candidates for some reason and instead utilized total subset allocation? And what would be the full protocol dependent upon the alternate criteria? As you may anticipate, whenever those leading range-tied candidate camps cannot agree who should receive the subset's elector slots, one of the leading range-tied candidates who possesses the highest total number of overall whole+partial elector values via the immediate national election results will be awarded the total subset slots. However, if there was a leading tie amongst any of them as well for the highest rank of overall whole+partial elector values possessed then starting from amongst those remaining (ta-da, shall we say...) leading trend-tied candidates we invoke in succession one of the latter determinations whenever there is lack of agreement among whatever remaining and relevant candidate camps exhibiting leading ties. Those successive determinations are: the range vote survey rankings by the House (or Senate for VP), Supreme Court's range vote survey rankings with option for a Supreme Court straight-ranking vote and then the drawing of lots whether invoked by the straight-ranking vote or due to same being waived. We use that order of precedence in order to decide who gets the subset's total elector slots or to weed out unmutual ties.

Now if there had been mutual agreement amongst the initial leading trend-tied candidates or amongst any remaining leading trend-tied candidates via any of the successive latter determinations occurring within the initial leading trend-tied scenario -- agreements by relevant parties as to who should receive subset elector slots -- such candidates are able to award the slots at their mutual whim without need of further invocation of alternate criteria just as in an initial, mutual leading range-tied scenario.

Notice from both the initial leading range-tied and initial leading trend-tied scenarios here that in the end through donations or mutual agreements neither total subset allocation nor any particular effective dispersion is required as a final outcome even though one method (namely total subset allocation this case) was officially or initially primed as the standard to handle such ties. This phenomenon holds everywhere whether total subset allocation or dispersion is the standard procedural method of determination concerning such ties within any subset.




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(D) Calling Outside Bodies To Settle Leading Trend-Tied Candidates (Total Subset Allocation)


When the latter determinations using the House (Senate for VP), Supreme Court range vote surveys, Supreme Court straight-ranking vote or the drawing of lots decide the particular subset's elector slot allocations regarding a tie situation involving any trend-tied candidates, we again take into account the mode used which is either total subset allocation or dispersion. We here in this section consider the case of total subset allocation to one victor. Barring any agreement amongst all initial leading trend-tied candidates, we then apply the House (or Senate) range vote survey rankings concerning them. If there is a leading tie there as well then again barring any agreement we resort to the Supreme Court's rankings by their previously taken range vote survey applicable to the remaining candidates in question. Now should the Supreme Court's range vote survey rankings pertaining to candidates in question also contain some leading tie lacking agreement then the Supreme Court may perform a straight-ranking vote towards a victor from any remaining candidates in question. The straight-ranking vote may invoke drawing of lots or same will occur if the Supreme Court waives right to carrying out a straight-ranking vote.




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(E) Calling Outside Bodies To Settle Trend-Tied Candidates (Dispersion)


Considering when dispersion is the mode utilized for leading range ties and therefore also for their embedded trend ties, we pick up where we left off earlier in the fourth paragraph of section (B):

'Should we also reach a tie in the total number of overall possessed whole+partial elector values via the immediate national election results between any remaining leading range-tied candidates eligible to be given elector slots and there are not enough slots to dish out equally between them in single fashion, then starting from amongst such leading range-tied candidates we invoke in succession one of the latter determinations whenever there is lack of agreement among whatever remaining and relevant candidate camps exhibiting ties. Those successive determinations are: the range vote survey rankings by the House (or Senate for VP), Supreme Court's range vote survey rankings with option for a Supreme Court straight-ranking vote and then the drawing of lots whether invoked by the straight-ranking vote or due to same being waived. We use that order of precedence in order to decide who gets the subset's remaining unclaimed elector slots in a dispersive manner or to weed out unmutual ties. This resorting to outside bodies concerning the leading range-tied candidates who are also tied by trending and in contention under dispersion for elector slots relatively fewer in number will be described more in depth in section (E). '

Well, here we go:

At any point where there are fewer unclaimed elector slots in a subset to assign amongst a string of trend-tied candidates who are embedded in the array of leading range-tied candidates, we need protocol to decide which of those trend-tied camps will get one of the remaining elector slots. So we resort to the pertinent results of the range vote survey taken before the election by the House for a presidential subset or Senate for a vice-presidential subset in order to award such elector slots -- barring mutual agreement amongst the trend-tied candidates. The successive ranks inherent in the particular range or score vote survey for the candidates involved will be what determines the order of a grant of an unclaimed elector slot from the subset to a particular trend-tied candidate along the string. Ties in the House or Senate range vote survey concerning the involved candidates can be tolerated as long as those tied will not end up contending for any fewer elector slots left to be vied for. Otherwise, barring agreement of the candidates affected the Supreme Court will settle ties that happen amongst them by its own range vote survey. Should the Supreme Court's range vote survey still not extinguish ties contending for fewer elector slots without mutual agreement, the Supreme Court may opt to carry out a straight-ranking vote upon the remaining and relevant candidates exhibiting unmutual tie and contending for relatively fewer electoral slots. If necessary, drawing of lots may be invoked by the straight-ranking vote or resorted to beforehand if straight-ranking vote was waived.




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Undeterminations And Precedences:




(F) Causes Of Undetermination


The range vote can leave out contenders for consideration who are rendered as undetermined. This can happen in a range vote election if a particular candidate does not achieve some threshold proportion of counter clicks compared to the one who receives the most iterations of same. In a simple range vote, an associated counter click increments by '1' for a valid numerical input attributed to a particular candidate by a voter even if they input a zero for the worst rating. Though non-numerical inputs such as 'X' which stands for N/A or 'don't know' from voters who have no knowledge or opinion of a candidate does not bring down the candidate's average rating, no increment in the click count occurs. Because of that, should such a candidate not reach the comparative threshold of counter clicks then their average rating whatever it is -- is moot. For elections, this keeps the more marginal candidates unable to win despite having the highest rating achieved yet only through their dedicated groupies. Marginals can also be kept in check by assigning all contenders an intitial number of zero ratings (T) just large enough in number so that the smaller share, less known candidates will have a lower average rating that inhibits victory. It may be best to use both the counter clicks and the initial zero ratings (T) for elections. Leaving out contenders as undetermined who do not garner enough counter clicks in the range vote survey merely by getting overlooked at no fault of their own seems harsh here -- especially as the range vote survey is meant to concentrate on settling small subsets or isolated samples of the electorate -- but we will introduce an implementation to eliminate this fairness concern further ahead.

There are other ways that we consider where candidates could become undetermined in the range vote survey. One theory -- some sort of data loss or technical glitch or even sabotage. However, with the official participants of the range vote survey being relatively few and accessible -- the candidates, potential electors, Congress, Supreme Court -- we could at worst resort to reiteration but more likely will rely on various backups to record their inputs. A more bothersome challenge would be some sort of natural or man-made cataclysm that would wipe out or render inaccessible for long period large swaths of the range vote survey official participants before completion or record. If there is enough time between an intended survey deadline and the election, any necessary replacements for those official participants can complete the survey in the mean time. With the major survey players being candidates and/or potential electors we could substitute either for each or even collect new potential electors from appropriate safe locales as need be on behalf of the various presidential campaigns. Taking such things into account, we might consider a 30-day before election deadline for most of the official range vote survey input while disqualifying grant of elector slots in response to any illegal revelations or controversies originating from a particular candidate during the interim. All this should make for repairable range vote surveys ranging from glitches to corruption and even up to when some of the more cataclysmic scenarios can yet be adjusted for.

In short, we rely on the range vote survey to derive official-initial victors for elector slots in subsets either by ranging a subset using the candidates' or potential electors' input or by the first two latter determinations concerning embedded ties which utilize input from either the House or Senate surveys and then if necessary the Supreme Court survey before resorting to the court's straight-ranking vote or the drawing of lots by candidates. Let us notice that at the level of contention in the process for elector slots amongst leading range-tied candidates without mutual agreement which invokes the first alternate criteria known as trending, that will not result in any undeterminations short of the more cataclysmic scenarios because all state legislatures will guarantee a determination of their state's electoral slate via the outfits established to handle any election return contingencies as described on the originating bicameral electoral college page.




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(G) Core Premise On Handling Undeterminations


Now for the core premise on handling undeterminations without remedy ocurring within the as described above repairable types of range vote surveys used in the process:



i) At any particular level of contention in the process pertaining to whatever remaining and relevant candidates who without mutual agreement are vying for any elector slot(s) where range vote survey undetermination without remedy occurs then any such candidate is blocked from winning further elector slots officially and initially from that subset thus losing rank to get them at that level and beyond. However, they may still get elector slots after the fact by donations from subset members who are in agreement.

ii) Under the dispersion method whenever there are fewer elector slots left to grant amongst the leading range-tied candidates and there occurs an unextinguished tie amongst them by trending, then starting from such unextinguished trending tie there is invocation in succession by order of precedence the latter methods upon whatever remaining and relevant candidates in order to determine their correlated rank towards a grant of an elector. If during those invocations we end up with fewer candidates in contention than elector slots left to grant due to undeterminations, then an equal base distribution takes place (or has taken place) going all the way back to all the first trending candidates who came before the unextinguished trending tie (if any) and all the candidates of the unextinguished trending tie who were given determined correlated rankings via the successive invocations of the latter methods. Any remainder elector slots after that will be granted one-by-one through the already established rankings of the candidates of this equal base distribution -- again namely the trending rankings of all those before the unextinguished trending tie (if any) and then the determined correlated rankings of candidates derived from the unextinguished trending tie.



In the upcoming section the effects of the core premise will lower in applicable frequency once we automate the range vote survey for the candidates and treat survey attritions as an undetermination in standard. Thus undeterminations under the more normal circumstances will be nipped in the bud at the range level.

Now should it happen that all of the pertinent and remaining candidates through all levels of contention for a subset -- eventually all candidate camps -- end up exhibiting range vote survey undetermination without remedy, then the remaining elector slots are to be given to particular candidate(s) outside of that subset (foreshadow of the managed penalty concept next section) who submitted their range vote survey input by deadline and as if they constituted a ranged subset (the macro subset) whose relative partial shares go by each candidate's total whole+partial elector values won via the immediate national election results. This outer "subset" assignment by first ranging the macro subset will be done according to total subset allocation or dispersion per whatever method is the standard and will use the same order of precedence for alternate criteria & the latter determinations should ties be encountered. Should any range vote survey undetermination without remedy be encountered out there, it will be treated with this core premise applying to any such candidate unless they all end up exhibiting range vote survey undetermination without remedy as well (theoretical exercise) where in that case we resort to a raffle for each one of the original subset's remaining electoral slots amongst the public who are allowed to be electors. (If getting this far out is not impossible, it should be astronomically and absurdly improbable but we include it to illustrate and convince you of recursive completeness.)




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(H) Automation Of Range Vote Survey And Standardization Of Undeterminations


As we said at end of the first paragraph in section (F) 'CAUSES OF UNDETERMINATION': 'Leaving out contenders as undetermined who do not garner enough counter clicks in the range vote survey merely by getting overlooked at no fault of their own seems harsh here -- especially as the range vote survey is meant to concentrate on settling small subsets or isolated samples of the electorate -- but we will introduce an implementation to eliminate this fairness concern further ahead.' We also just spoke of nipping undeterminations in the bud and lowering application frequency of the core premise on handling undeterminations. We begin with some more reasoning........

There could be a lost opportunity if a particular candidate camp yields range vote survey undetermination without remedy while perhaps inhabiting a more disparate subset, possibly missing allocation of an elector slot that would have made a presidential difference. This is why we do not want any candidate camp however small in the electoral college share to be overlooked at no fault of their own in any of the range vote surveys used for ranging the scrap nor in the congresssional house and Supreme Court surveys should ties ever go to that extent. Yet the way we have set things up so far, it is possible that a campaign could actually attain some elector share, help determine rank of others in a subset by having participated in the range vote survey themselves while getting overlooked and rendered as undetermined without remedy in survey. So they lose rank towards subset elector slots at no fault of their own at various contention levels. This may not be often or any big deal when it does, but then again it may happen with more weight.

Let us prevent such scenarios from happening while making the range vote survey easier to complete and easier to apply to all candidates, generally more automatic, more unbiased for and upon everyone involved. Occurrence of non-remedial range vote survey undeterminations that are at the mercy of other participants overlooking a candidate should be virtually eliminated while swapping those for undeterminations without remedy that are acting as self-imposed penalties upon candidate camps who do not participate in the range vote surveys. To achieve all this we now propose an implementation structure for the range vote survey where participants rate or indicate just once how their ideal presidential candidate would function through their reflective input in response to the issues covered in the survey. Then using this response as a rubric, the difference in how another fills out the survey in comparison would provide for the automatic rating upon any presidential candidate when they submit their own ideal input as a key. For example, conventionalize that '0' is to mean 'very strongly oppose', '100' as 'very strongly agree' and '50' as neutral. A survey topic rating the importance of having a candidate who is a heavy tax-cutter and tax system reformer gets response from the first individual as an '82' and the second individual a '31'. We can now peg about each individual a relative difference to the input which comes from an actual presidential candidate (or their camp). Say here in this case a candidate professing a '53' pegs a difference at -29, a relative low to the first individual and at +22, a relative high to the second individual. Survey input can be submitted via 'S.A.T.' ovals and digitized along with comparative difference to the input of presidential candidates all of which will provide the base for the rankings of candidates within the range vote surveys.

We can benefit as well by having particular sections of the survey weighed in their relative importance to particular partakers by letting them indicate within reason what they feel the proportion different topics should carry. Those sections may be: economics, national security, immigration, health care, taxation, etc. One's own such ratios in comparison to a presidential candidate's can help gauge them and thus their matchability in priorities. A background section should also be a part of the presidential candidate's survey submission, limited in characters which includes a brief resume and portfolio of experience by the candidate. That part being more subjective could be rated by hand separate from the rest of the survey by the official participants up to a later deadline. The proposed 30-day before election deadline for the other main sections would help provide the time for inspection of all candidates' stances in the survey by the public. For the more dire scenarios this would serve to provide a testament on record to fall back upon or an interim to carry out any needed replacements/manuevers. Candidates who do not submit their input by the deadline will be range-vote undetermined in any subsets they should share -- rendering them unable to receive any subset's free elector slot allocations by official and initial contentions. They would miss out on grant of electors in more disparate subsets which could possibly determine president on their behalf in a close race. Though they may still obtain elector slots in a subset by a mutual donation of other members after the fact, that means more dependence and they will also be more likely seen as suspicious and garner less share in the electoral college. Public interaction to the candidate survey key makes for greater ease in assessing between candidates for president. A useful tool, the public could fulfill the survey themselves assuming a deadline for the official particpants far enough ahead of election day. This would facilitate voter assessment of candidates by seeing how any contender deviates from their own ideal survey norm as opposed to just relying on fluffy ads, campaign literature and contrived debates. To be fair, any manipulative word-smithing will be guarded against as discussed earlier in 'Survey Of Candidates By Range Vote' concerning advocation of the more qualitative aspects of the survey.




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(I) Correlation Precedence And The Supreme Court Straight-Ranking Vote


Remember when there are applicable ties within the congressional house surveys which leave any elector slots in contention, we resort to the Supreme Court range vote survey rankings to settle any such ties. Notice we do not override any of the other rankings already determined by the House or Senate range vote surveys, we only correlate the applicably tied candidates in question to their relative rankings within the Supreme Court range vote survey to provide order of a grant of an elector slot. If ties should happen there in the Supreme Court range vote survey involving prior contention in whole or in part from the House or Senate range vote surveys then the Supreme Court can have a straight-ranking vote concerning the candidates in question in order to allot the elector slots.

You may ask -- How does the court carry out a straight-ranking vote? Well, if the candidates in question are a mere two, the usual straight majority vote will do. If abstention here results in a tie or not enough justices partake to perform, the candidates in question are passed on to drawing lots. Now if there are three or more candidates in question, each participating justice must assign a rank number to each of them. Those ranks go from 1 for the most favored for an elector slot allocation to K for the least favored for an elector slot allocation where K equals the number of candidates in question. Elector slots are then awarded to candidates from low to high aggregate ranking according to dispersion or total subset allocation. If however there is a resulting embedded tie involving fewer than K of the candidates that were in question where there is unsettled contention for elector slots, the justices will again repeat the assigning of rank numbers (or just usual straight majority vote) but focusing only on those embedded and tied candidates in order to rank them despite their previous tie. Repeat this nesting of the straight-ranking vote until all further embedded candidate ties in contention are settled.

Justices who participate in a straight-ranking vote must complete their ranking of all the relevant candidates (when >2) with each ranked uniquely and in complete order from 1 to K or their input will be disqualified. If not enough justices participate in a straight-ranking vote or too many have input disqualified or all K candidates tie, the relevant candidates will instead be subjected to random allocations by the drawing of lots. Actually, if all justices tire of the procedure (multiple nestings perhaps) or they all pass on performing a straight-ranking vote for any reason, relevant candidates will be resorted to drawing lots. It will be allowable for candidate camps to appoint someone on their behalf should the candidates themselves decide not to draw lots.




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Unforeseen Circumstances


For any cataclysmic or unforseen circumstances not fixable herein where such widespread undeterminations make range vote surveys unreliable in assigning subset elector slot allocations, we can at first fallback to reliance on the parties who make up subsets to have mutual agreements for the elector slots without even being able to adequately range the subset. Should that not work, we could then rely on the applicable congressional house to make direct allocation of subset electors restricted to the particular subset's candidate camps as a somewhat analogous, small foreshadow to Amendment XII under the part when no person had electoral college majority. Another option is to override the bicameral electoral college and turn to the Constitution party's approach (or similar) in assigning electors for each state. We leave to the state legislatures and the Congress to make such further contingencies more formal by law as they would have to consider for any election system in use. Whatever they decide upon, they should not revert to state-by-state unanimous-only slates of electors like we have now as that is an electoral college for chumps who choose a president or let him govern by ignoring a substantial number of whole states as opposed to some competitive intra-state award of electors which gears a president to preside more on behalf of the whole country and accounting for more of its varied interests.




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Overkill To Hammer Out Theory & Process




Actually, this process description may be overkill since range voting is said to rarely result in ties. So it could be that most if not all scrap mixed-share elector subsets get determined by initial range vote survey application. Won't this greatly limit the need of the more involved subset elector slot allocation machinations? One would think off-hand that even if there are leading range-tied subsets without agreement that trending will usually resolve them. Alternates or latter procedures likely not need to be invoked but if needed will ensure elector slot allocation under precedences considered. Nonetheless, we delve into the subset elector slot allocations to be prepared for any possible close election results but also to more fully explain the intent and justification that the functions of this process are based on.




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Computer Simulation




It would be desirable to analyze these situations through a computer simulation of the whole bicameral electoral college especially for close or extreme elections in order to get a good idea of the behaviors of this process and its protocols. Speaking of computers, there should also be 'firms' on behalf of the candidate camps using electoral exchange applications that preview and seek out the best mixed-share elector subsets to construct amongst the various political cliques in order to achieve the most desirable elector slot allocations possible. The situation may be in flux and experience various changes as one candidate camp decides to pair partial and spliced elector shares with others. Perhaps applications using the tenets of matrix or linear algebra will come in handy during these efforts. The exchanges may not be of great importance in some presidential elections but more so in others.




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Commonwealth Party
Process To Allocate Scrap Mixed-Share Electors
Last Revised: 7/22/14


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