Linked from 'BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM' page (Bicam II)
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I. The Compensations
With compensations, we attempted to provide an alternate check where an embedded majority within the voters who cast ballots for the county commissioner-elect could cancel that commissioner's input towards the appointment of the state senate seat. A box on the ballot near the county commissioner race indicated this desire. So when such an embedded majority was reached, that county commissioner-elect's appointment vote for state senator was not to be counted among the other allowed county commissioner-elects' votes for the same within the state senatorial district or county.
Analogous was for any such likewise embedded majority occurring against a state representative-elect's choice for the share of presidential electors. In that case, such a state representative was to be denied the share of presidential electors on behalf of that representative district with all other approving districts absorbing them instead.
Another option pertained to a county commissioner-elect whose appointment vote for one elected state senator had been approved by the embedded majority within those who cast votes for that county commissioner-elect. Now if yet another majority within that majority disapproved of the appointed state senator's choice for president then that state senator's share of presidential electors was reduced by the relative number of such disapproving majorities occurring for the county commissioners-elect whose appointment votes for that state senator were allowed to be counted.
II. Why Derived
Such alternate compensations were derived for cases when the state representative candidates or the county commissioner candidates for a constituency all wound up exhibiting unanimous choice for only one or one type of presidential or state senatorial candidate respectively. The compensations were also designed for cases where the desired state representative candidate or county commissioner candidate for the particular winning faction of a constituency exhibited a contradictory choice for presidential or state senatorial contender respectively. These compensations were to exhibit more in binary or near binary elections for the constituencies since with sufficiently more significant candidates, any embedded choice-opposing slim majorities within the smaller plural-based yet winning factions could become significantly less representational, less relevant and perhaps yielding more extreme results in regards to the overall picture.
III. Irony for Unanimous, Contradictory or Even Consistent Endorsements
Upon further thought, the implementation of these compensations could actually maintain opportunity in some cases for the occurrence of the unanimous or contradictory endorsements by elected state representative candidates and county commissioner candidates concerning presidential electors and state senators respectively. For example, consider if polls are taken up to the election that show to a particular state representative district that a particular state house candidate say harboring a contradictory presidential endorsement is virtually guaranteed to win by an immutable but basic majority. The opposing voters within that district will then decide that since there is an impending victory by the house candidate they oppose, they may as well vote strategically to at least get the presidential endorsement they seek at the state representative level. So if the ratio is close enough in the impending house victor candidate's camp concerning the denial of that candidate's unanimous or here a contradictory presidential elector choice, then the opposing faction(s) will insincerely vote for that impending house candidate victor as well. They do so to yield a resultant embedded majority within the votes cast for that winning contender that will approve the unanimous or contradictory endorsement that was instead to have been blocked by the sincere, original core voting faction for the winner.
Similar can be invoked by an opposition with regards to an impending winner for a county-commissioner race. They mobilize for the expected winner in that district insincerely, seeking through a resultant embedded majority to allow the impending county commissioner-elect's contradictory or unanimous choice towards the appointment of state senator. Such a contradictory or unanimous state senator by view of the original, sincere core voting faction could be appointed if the opposition facilitates their resultant embedded majorities in enough such county commissioner races should they occur. As well, such a strategy would also be utilized by that opposition upon polls indicating the inevitable victory of a state senator candidate due to a forecast of more than enough county commissioners-elect who will be able to appoint that particular state senator candidate who just happens to exhibit a contradictory or unanimous presidential elector preference according to the reason or dismay of a more aligned sincere, core faction across particular districts. Hence, in whatever county commissioner district whose expected county commissioner-elect will be allowed to vote to appoint that state senator but with an original, sincere doubly-embedded core ratio closely disapproving of that senator's presidential elector choice; the opposition will attach their insincere support to the expected county commissioner-elect. This is while approving of the commissioner-elect's choice for that state senator in order to facilitate an embedded majority within the embedded majority which will keep that state senator's share of presidential electors from being reduced by the district's original sincere disapproval as described by the third paragraph in the first section.
It is however more likely or frequent if the compensations are always available that such an opposition as just described in the examples above will take to these insincere methods just as well when the sincere, core faction obtains wins for state representative and county commissioner candidates whose presidential elector and state senatorial choices respectively are consistent with faction ideology. Yet there nonetheless exists enough of a ratio within the supporters who - for whatever reason - attempt disapproval of the consistent choices. Same for the state senator candidate's choice for presidential electors. Wherever such ratios occur, the opposition will attach their insincere support to the relevant candidates in order to yield a resultant embedded majority within the impending opposed candidate's support that yields here a secondary appointment effect that will be more agreeable to the opposition. So it is the same basic strategy in need of the same invocation ratio and proportion thresholds but launched on inverse footings yet still towards an edge for the opposition.
The frequency of those strategic voting occurrences depends on the ratios of embedded secondary agreement or disapproval within a winning candidate's supporting voters, the candidates' relative election shares, priorities of the electorate regarding local-state-national outcomes, closeness of the races, cleverness and dedication of the voters, etc. Herein, the included examples of insincere or strategic voting concerning the compensations exposes the irony that the compensations may actually provide more incentive to various factions to reinforce the very unanimous/contradictory results that were supposed to be negated or even to thwart the consistent ones. In closer contests for appointing state senators, insincere reversals by the opposition thwarts presidential elector selection by those who are duly appointed due to the partitions over the local & state issues as opposed to a more populist, gamed-opportunism across commissioner districts. There is then some possibility for regional resemblance to the results of a mere popular vote by districts as opposed to facilitating the notion of higher state and federal office selections being dependent upon appointments through duly chosen local and state officeholders which is something we want to preserve in the system.
Despite these concerns we have illustrated, the compensations may not come under all these ironic occurrences if applied under certain election & constituency conditions. Perhaps some restrictive parameters need to be applied to achieve such. Plus the compensations do have some ability to avoid functioning mathematically as would a popular vote by district - which is good. Think like when a certain state representative-elect's presidential elector choice is disapproved by an embedded majority of supporters. Such cancellation yields a different result than if some other presidential candidate favored by the blocking faction(s) was able to overlay the representative district's electors. Instead, those electors are absorbed unto the surrounding districts that exhibit inherent approval of their representative-elect's presidential choice.
In applying the compensations, we would also have to incorporate the proper proportions to be used for the at-large county commissioners-elect alongside the district-bound variety. Note too that the mode of state senator appointments by senatorial districts as described in "Appointing State Senators Via Senatorial Districts" on the Bicameral Electoral College Reform page where the state senatorial district lines were splitting county commissioner districts made imperative the use of election shares of all candidates for county commissioner in each district. Using them all instead of just the voice of each county commissioner-elect as described on this page adds to the tracking of the intricacies of function.
V. Weigh System, Feasibility
And as far as a system to best limit or prevent a constituency from getting stuck with unanimous or contradictory secondary appointment choices from the candidate slate of county commissioners, state representatives and state senators -- we may wish to consider the general use of the range (or score) vote system which can handle a larger, more diverse selection of candidates and enables more expressive choice concurrently. It exhibits superiorities over the sole reliance on plurality voting's primaries which can create the boxed-in slates of candidates that may contain those unanimous and contradictory appointment choices. Range or score vote's inherent ratings can better reflect priorities of the local-state-national issues and it systematically better protects against insincere or strategic voting.
We thus leave it to the readers to weigh the merits and feasibility of the herein described compensations and if they are not as useful here then perhaps somewhere else possibly under certain conditions they may be incorporated.
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